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Abstract 
 
Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) for Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) has 
been a new area of research – seeking to provide situational awareness to mission and 
maintenance operations, and for improved decision-making with increased self-
autonomy. This research effort developed an analytic architecture and an associated 
discrete-event simulation using Arena ® to investigate the potential benefits of ISHM 
implementation onboard an UAS. The objective of this research is two-fold: firstly, to 
achieve continued airworthiness by investigating the potential extension of UAS expected 
lifetime through ISHM implementation, and secondly, to reduce life cycle costs by 
implementing a Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM) policy with better failure 
predictions made possible with ISHM. Through a series of design experiments, it was 
shown that ISHM presented the most cost-effective improvement over baseline systems 
in situations where the reliability of the UAS is poor (relative to manned systems) and the 
baseline sensor exhibited poor qualities in terms of missed detection and false alarm 
rates. From the simulation results of the test scenarios, it was observed that failure 
occurrence rates, sensor quality characteristics and ISHM performance specifications 
were significant factors in determining the output responses of the model. The desired 
outcome of this research seeks to provide potential designers with top-level performance 
specifications of an ISHM system based on specified airworthiness and maintenance 
requirements for the envisaged ISHM-enabled UAS. 
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ARCHITECTING INTEGRATED SYSTEM HEALTH MANAGEMENT 
FOR AIRWORTHINESS 
I.  Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The challenges of tomorrow’s battlefield involve time-critical decision making in a 
massive whirlpool of available information – and the best decision needs to be made 
every time, all the time. The Office of the Chief Scientist of the United States Air Force 
(AF/ST) released a report in May 2010 that advocated greater use of highly flexible 
autonomous systems; seeking to provide significant time-domain operational advantages 
over adversaries limited by human processing and decision speeds. In order to achieve 
these gains from the use of autonomous systems, new methods will need to be developed 
to establish “certifiable trust in autonomy” through verification and validation of the 
near-infinite state systems that result from high levels of adaptability [Dahm, 2010]. 
 
In the domain of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), trust in autonomy can be determined 
by airworthiness, the safety record, or the number of successful missions. Existing 
technology has not brought UAS to a state of complete autonomy with command and 
control (C2) still residing in the human operator during critical phases of flight or 
mission. Diagnostic and prognostic algorithms seek to improve the self-autonomy of 
UAS through detection and isolation of faults, and determination of the best course of 
action. Although in-flight fault-monitoring or detection protocols currently exist for 
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specific flight critical sub-systems, a UAS-wide health monitoring and decision system 
has seldom been implemented.  
 
For manned aircraft, Health and Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMS) technology had 
been developed since the 1980s in response to airworthiness concerns for helicopters. 
HUMS implementation normally involves a comprehensive suite of sensors measuring 
vital aircraft parameters (e.g. vibration and temperature) spanning over critical sub-
systems such as the engine, rotor and gearbox. The HUMS will also include software to 
handle data processing (diagnostics) and prognostics to enhance overall aircraft safety 
and reliability through condition-based maintenance [Miller et al., 1991]. 
 
With the same motivation, Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) for UAS has 
been a new area of research – seeking to provide situational awareness to mission and 
maintenance operations, and for improved decision-making with increased self-
autonomy.  Through a centralized health management system, ISHM identifies necessary 
sources of input data from multiple sensors, generates the status of real-time UAS 
capabilities, and initiates the best course of action in relation to airworthiness and/or 
mission objectives. These objectives can be measured by an improvement in expected 
lifetime or an overall reduction in the maintenance costs. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
According to the Air Force Policy Directive 62-6, airworthiness is defined as “the 
verified and documented capability of an air system configuration to safely attain, 
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sustain, and terminate flight in accordance with approved usage and limits” [Donley, 
2010]. To this end, Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) has been a 
necessary process in most airworthiness type certification plans. FMECA is a procedure 
that identifies potential failure modes (and effects) of a system, and thereafter ranks these 
failure modes based on the combination of their severity and probability of occurrence. 
[DoD, 2005]. Although FMECA has been widely applied (or mandatory in some cases) 
during conceptual or preliminary design phases, its applications during the operational 
phase of a UAS has been limited. Furthermore, the integration of FMECA considerations 
within an ISHM architecture deserves deeper exploration. 
 
Previous research on ISHM evaluated the effect of ISHM on mission effectiveness; and a 
baseline model had been implemented to quantify the mission-related benefits of ISHM 
by constructing architecture for analysis to compare against current autonomous vehicle 
capabilities [Storm, 2013]. The focus of this research extends beyond previous efforts 
through increased realism of the ISHM architecture by considering FMECA data for 
UAS airworthiness, sensor fusion of existing and ISHM sensors, and attempts to develop 
a business case for condition-based maintenance with improved diagnostics and 
prognostics provided by ISHM. 
1.3 Research Objectives and Hypothesis 
The objectives of this research are to quantify the continued airworthiness benefits of 
ISHM by developing an analytic architecture for comparison between an “as-is” UAS 
(without ISHM capabilities) and a “to-be” UAS (with ISHM capabilities). From an 
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airworthiness certification perspective, this research aims to develop a method for 
establishing performance requirements for components of an ISHM-enabled UAS. An 
analysis of the architecture will examine the effects of ISHM decisions through stipulated 
algorithms, ISHM reliability through the performance and degradation of its sensors-
diagnostics-prognostics suite, and the associated costs of maintenance.  
 
Adopting a modeling and simulation approach, the research presented in this thesis shall 
attempt to answer the following questions: 
(1) What are the performance characteristics of ISHM to ensure continued 
airworthiness of the UAS?  
(2) How will ISHM provide a business case to improve the level of UAS self-
autonomy? 
(3) What are the potential impacts of ISHM to maintenance practices and life 
cycle costs? 
 
Prior to the formal research work, a literature review was conducted to answer related 
questions in the research field: 
 (1) What is system health monitoring/management and what are some related 
applications? 
 (2) What are the essential elements of ISHM? 
 (3) What are the critical FMECA hazards associated with a typical UAS and their 
relation to airworthiness? 
 (4) What is Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM)? 
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1.4 Methodology 
An analytical architecture shall be developed in accordance with the Department of 
Defense Architecture Framework [DoD, 2012], simulating ISHM over the lifetime of the 
UAS with the primary architectural goal to achieve cost-effective improvements to 
airworthiness. The architecture will attempt to model the typical failure modes of a 
generic UAS and derive its life expectancy as a proxy for continued airworthiness 
certification of a UAS, both with and without ISHM for statistical comparison. It is 
anticipated that there will be a system design paradigm shift with this architecture being 
able to establish performance requirements for components of an ISHM-enabled UAS; 
possibly with reduced redundancy and cost with information fusion enabled by ISHM – 
to achieve the same or higher airworthiness standards. 
 
Implementation-wise, the architecture developed shall be generic enough to be applied 
across various UAS platforms with appropriate FMECA information. A discrete-event 
simulation approach shall be adopted to develop realistic models for (a) on-board ISHM 
implementation with diagnostics and/or prognostics algorithms, and (b) purely baseline 
sensors available in UAS hardware without ISHM. As a secondary objective, a life-cycle 
cost model of the ISHM suite can also be derived to account for possible degradation 
(made apparent through high false alarm or missed detection rates) that will require 
replacement – and provide a holistic picture of the maintenance costs of an ISHM-
enabled UAS.  
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1.5 Assumptions and Limitations 
The primary research objective is to investigate the potential benefits of ISHM onboard 
UAS – a relatively new knowledge domain with limited implementation data. As such, 
there need to be several assumptions providing boundaries of this research for it to be 
useful:  
(1) Without actual FMECA data, it will not be possible to model and/or evaluate 
all the failure modes for a typical UAS. As such, only selected critical sub-system 
failures affecting airworthiness of the UAS shall be evaluated using the model. 
(2) Without actual sensor performance data, theoretical/nominal thresholds will 
need to be assumed to model sensor degradation in terms of False Alarm Rate 
(FAR) and missed detections. 
1.6 Implications 
From an airworthiness perspective, the direct implication of this research lies in its ability 
to establish meaningful metrics and design-to requirements for an ISHM-enabled UAS. A 
validated ISHM can provide the desired level of UAS self-autonomy to detect, diagnose 
and implement corrective actions as necessary. This, in turn, drives future UAS designs 
that can operate with reduced redundancy (and maintenance demands) with diagnostic 
and prognostic capabilities provided by ISHM. In the longer term, sustained 
airworthiness records with onboard ISHM will be able to foster greater trust in 
autonomy. 
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With the improved intelligence behind airworthy UAS, complex mission tasks can then 
be entrusted upon UAS with greater collaborative capabilities (including mission re-
planning based on system health) and wider operational envelopes [MacConnell, 2006]. 
On the other hand, drawing negative parallels from science fiction, the movie “Oblivion” 
featured fully autonomous drones controlled by an alien artificial intelligence that had 
invaded Earth [Kosinski, 2013]. These drones would operate collaboratively to dominate 
Earth and were programmed to kill humans on sight. Therefore, a delicate balance of 
autonomy and delegation of authority needs to be established with ISHM. See Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Desired Capabilities of ISHM and Unknown Threats of Autonomy [Kosinski, 2013] 
 
  
Desired ISHM Capabilities 
Sustained Airworthiness 
Availability 
Mission Success 
Collaborative Capabilities 
Reduced Redundancy 
Lower Costs of Maintenance 
Unknown Threats 
Rules of Engagement 
Delegation of Power/Authority 
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1.7 Preview 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. The introductory chapter discusses the 
background, problem statement and objectives of the research. The descriptions of the 
ensuing chapters are as follow: 
• Chapter II examines the current state of system health 
monitoring/management and its related applications, and provides an 
understanding of the main elements of ISHM. This chapter also highlights 
airworthiness and system safety concepts, presents a preliminary FMECA 
hazard assessment of a typical UAS, and discusses the benefits of the ideal 
ISHM system.   
• Chapter III describes the research methodology through the proposed 
analytic architecture. 
• Chapter IV presents the results and associated analysis of the discrete-
event simulation model. 
• Chapter V draws conclusions regarding the research objectives, and 
proposes potential areas for future research. 
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II. Literature Review 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
The objectives of this chapter are to examine the current state of system health 
monitoring/management and its related applications, provide an understanding of the 
main elements of ISHM, highlight airworthiness and system safety concepts, present a 
preliminary FMECA hazard assessment of a typical UAS, and discuss the benefits of the 
ideal ISHM system. 
2.2 System Health Management 
This section presents various definitions of system health monitoring/management in its 
various related applications. 
 
2.2.1 Application in Health Care 
There exist varied definitions and applications of system health management; with its 
most direct application in health care. In a recent technology ‘disruption’ to health care, 
IBM’s Watson – the same machine that beat Ken Jennings at Jeopardy - was being 
‘tutored’ at Memorial Sloan-Kettering, perusing through medical case histories and 
learning to make diagnoses and treatment recommendations [Cohn, 2013]. This 
innovation seeks intelligence beyond simple electronic look-ups of medical encyclopedia. 
Although the future of a robot seeing a patient in place of a human doctor remains to be 
seen, intelligence in the form of Watson provides consistency of decisions amongst 
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available medical solutions, based on accurate clinical examinations and evidence. 
Another medical innovation exists in the form of a device called the Stealth Vest, 
wearable sensor technology that can continuously communicate data without the patient 
even being aware of it [Glen, 2012]. This was developed by a group of researchers based 
at Emory University and Georgia Tech primarily for teenagers, who are less likely to 
comply with physician instructions about taking readings or medications.  
 
The technological breakthroughs in health care, in the areas of sensor data fusion and 
artificial intelligence, presented similarities to an ideal ISHM architecture that integrates 
processed sensor information and intelligence through diagnostics and prognostics 
algorithms. 
 
2.2.2 Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) in Helicopters 
Increased demand for improved operational safety and reduced rotorcraft maintenance 
costs had paved the way for HUMS [Wiig, 2006]. These systems emerged in the 1980s as 
a response to the high accident rates experienced by offshore shuttle helicopters 
traversing the petrol installations in the North Sea. The UK Civil Aviation Authority 
(CAA) defined HUMS in two main subsystems: a Vibration Monitoring System (VMS), 
and a Usage Monitoring System (UMS). The latter included functions such as 
temperature and torque monitoring, magnetic plugs and chip detectors. The VMS 
addresses the Health aspect of HUMS and should monitor: 
• engine to main gearbox input drive shafts,  
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• main gearbox shafts, gears and bearings,  
• accessory gears, shafts and bearings, 
• tail rotor drive shafts and bearings, 
• intermediate and tail gearbox gears, shafts and bearings, 
• oil cooler drive, and 
• main and tail rotor track and balance. 
 
In terms of process management, the typical processes of a HUMS program are depicted 
in Figure 2 [JHSIT, 2013]. Basic HUMS operation requires that data be displayed on a 
ground station after download, identifying any primary indicators exceeding their pre-
defined thresholds. Recent history of primary and secondary data should also be available 
to maintenance personnel for comparison against past alerts (or false alarms) to ensure 
continued airworthiness of the aircraft. The ability to trend data and facilitate comparison 
with other aircraft, fleet average thresholds or other health indicators is also 
recommended.  
 
 
Figure 2 – HUMS Processes [JHSIT, 2013] 
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The following processes are defined for a HUMS program [JHSIT, 2013]: 
• Data Acquisition and Transfer – The process of acquiring data from the various 
sensors and transferring it to a ground station. It is important to download HUMS 
data regularly to ensure currency of HUMS data. 
• Data Analysis – This includes the review of HUMS data by a maintainer on the 
flight line for advisories or threshold exceedances, followed by a detailed analysis 
by a trained HUMS analyst or engineer. The latter is best accomplished by 
trending historical vibration data against the rest of the fleet – and this helps in the 
analysis for lesser known faults. 
• Data Validation – Whenever a measurement is recorded, there is a chance for 
error. As such, whenever a HUMS generates an alert, an effort must be made to 
ensure that the alert is valid. A collaborative data exchange utilizing maintenance 
records, pilot and mechanic recorded discrepancies, vibration readings, oil 
analysis, visual inspection etc. will be essential in reducing such erroneous alerts 
or false alarms. 
• Training – It is important that technicians or maintainers are adequately trained to 
deliver the first level of analysis on the flight line – critical for releasing an 
aircraft for subsequent flights. Thereafter, HUMS analysts or engineers will then 
need to be provided additional tools to deliver deeper analysis and trending 
information. 
 
HUMS originated from an airworthiness concern, and its implementation drove extensive 
research in condition-based rotorcraft maintenance. Understanding the HUMS 
architecture and associated processes will provide alignment in this research in 
developing maintenance cost models. 
 
2.2.3 Integrated Vehicle Health Management 
Integrated vehicle health management (IVHM) is a collection of data relevant to the 
present and future performance of a vehicle system and its transformation into 
information can be used to support operational decisions. This design and operation 
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concept embraces an integration of sensors, communication technologies, and artificial 
intelligence to provide vehicle-wide abilities to diagnose problems and recommend 
solutions [Benedettini et al., 2009]. The author also presented various definitions of 
IVHM found in the literature, as presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 – IHVM Definitions [Benedettini et al., 2009] 
 
Author Definition of IVHM 
NASA, 1992 
‘The capability to efficiently perform checkout, testing, and monitoring of 
space transportation vehicles, subsystems, and components before, during, 
and after operation.’…‘must support fault-tolerant response including 
system/subsystem reconfiguration to prevent catastrophic failure; and 
IVHM must support the planning and scheduling of post-operational 
maintenance.’ 
Aaseng, 2001 
‘All the activities that are performed to understand the state of the vehicle 
and its components, to restore the vehicle to nominal system status when 
malfunctions occur, and to minimize safety risks and mission impacts that 
result from system failures’ 
Baroth et al., 2001 
An ‘effort to coordinate, integrate, and apply advanced software, sensors, 
and design technologies to increase the level of intelligence, autonomy, 
and health state determination and response of future vehicles’ 
Roemer et al., 2001 
‘Integrates component, subsystem, and system level health monitoring 
strategies, consisting of anomaly/diagnostic/prognostic technologies, with 
an integrated modelling architecture that addresses failure mode 
mitigation and lifecycle costs’ 
Price et al., 2003 
‘An example of an intelligence sensing system. The purpose of such 
system is to detect and measure certain quantities, and to use the 
information and knowledge obtained from the measured data, and any 
prior knowledge, to make intelligent, forward-looking decisions, and 
initiate actions’ 
Wilmering, 2003 
‘The unified capability of an arbitrarily complex system of systems to 
accurately assess the current state of member system health, predict some 
future state of the health of member systems, and assess that state of 
health within the appropriate framework of available resources and 
operational demand’ 
Paris et al., 2005 ‘The process of assessing, preserving, and restoring system functionality across flight and ground systems’ 
Jakovljevic and Artner, 2006 
‘Ensures the reliable capture of the “health status” of the overall aerospace 
system and helps to prevent its degradation or failure by providing reliable 
information about problems and faults’ 
Karsai et al., 2006 
‘Its goal is to provide better ways for operating and maintaining aerospace 
vehicles using techniques, such as condition monitoring, anomaly 
detection, fault isolation, and managing the vehicle operations in the case 
of faults’ 
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2.3 Architecture of ISHM 
From the literature presented, Figure 3 depicts a suggested architecture for ISHM. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Typical ISHM Architecture [Benedettini et al., 2009] 
 
At the front end of the architecture is a sensor suite responsible for gathering state 
awareness variables that are indicative of potential failure modes. For an envisaged 
ISHM configuration, apart from conventional sensors that monitor and control sub-
systems, system-level sensor suites are also being introduced in the form of smart 
embedded sensor systems with wireless communications transfer protocol in place for 
overall system health management. Upon filtering of sensor data to extract relevant fault 
features, the diagnostics module analyzes the fault features to detect, identify and isolate 
impending fault conditions. In addition, with health and usage data being fed to the 
prognostic module, the latter is able to combine historical data to generate an estimation 
of the time-to-failure of specific subsystems and components. Depending on the level of 
autonomy, such diagnostic and prognostic information can be processed on-board the 
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vehicle through its auto-recovery systems or communicated to technical support 
managers on ground.  
 
Although there exist various definitions of IHVM, they seem to align to this ideal ISHM 
configuration – that will provide a basis for the analytic architecture of this research. 
2.4 Airworthiness and System Safety Framework 
System safety is the application of engineering and management principles, criteria and 
techniques to optimize all aspects of safety within the constraints of operational 
effectiveness, time and cost throughout all phases of the system life cycle. MIL-STD-882 
is the primary reference for system safety program information for DoD weapon systems. 
A system safety program is crucial for the initial and continued airworthiness of all 
weapon systems; with the following objectives as listed in the Air Force System Safety 
Handbook [AFSC, 2000]:  
a. Safety, consistent with mission requirements, is designed into the system in a 
timely, cost-effective manner; 
b. Hazards are identified, evaluated, and eliminated, or the associated risk reduced to 
a level acceptable to the managing activity (MA) throughout the entire life cycle 
of a system; 
c. Historical safety data, including lessons learned from other systems, are 
considered and used; 
d. Minimum risk is sought in accepting and using new designs, materials, and 
production and test techniques; 
e. Actions taken to eliminate hazards or reduce risk to a level acceptable to the MA 
are documented; 
f. Retrofit actions are minimized; 
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g. Changes in design, configuration, or mission requirements are accomplished in a 
manner that maintains a risk level acceptable to the MA; 
h. Consideration is given to safety, ease of disposal, and demilitarization of any 
hazardous materials associated with the system; 
i. Significant safety data are documented as “lessons learned” and are submitted to 
data banks, design handbooks, or specifications; 
j. Hazards identified after production are minimized consistent with program 
constraints. 
 
Understanding airworthiness requirements and the fundamental objectives of the System 
Safety Framework provides the impetus to this research. 
 
2.4.1 Mishap Severity and Probabilities 
In accordance with the system safety framework and MIL-STD-882, hazard analyses 
based on failure modes are classified according to mishap severity categories and 
probabilities listed in Table 2. Appropriate risk mitigation measures are devised after the 
risk assessment has been made. The mishap assessment also serves as a guideline for the 
appropriate authorities to accept any residual risk after mitigation measures have been 
implemented.  
 
For this research, different severity categories and probability levels of failure modes 
will initiate different courses of actions in the discrete-event simulation.  
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Table 2 – Suggested Mishap Severity Categories and Probability Levels [DoD, 2000] 
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2.4.2 Hazard Reduction Precedence 
In line with the system safety program objectives, the order of precedence for satisfying 
system safety requirements and resolving identified hazards is depicted in Figure 4 
[AFSC, 2000]. 
 
Step 1. Design for Minimum Risk – Design to eliminate hazards. If an identified 
hazard cannot be eliminated, reduce the associated risk to an acceptable level, as 
defined by the MA, through design selection. 
 
Step 2. Incorporate Safety Devices – If identified hazards cannot be eliminated or 
their associated risk adequately reduced through design selection, that risk shall be 
reduced to a level acceptable to the MA through the use of fixed, automatic, or 
other protective safety design features or devices. 
 
Step 3. Provide Warning Devices – When neither design nor safety devices can 
effectively eliminate identified hazards or adequately reduce associated risk, 
device shall be used to detect the condition and to produce an adequate warning 
signal to alert personnel of the hazard.  
 
Step 4. Develop Procedures and Training – Where it is impractical to eliminate 
hazards through design selection or adequately reduce the associated risk with 
safety and warning devices, procedures and training shall be used. Procedures 
may include the use of personal protective equipment. 
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With an ISHM-enabled UAS, it is anticipated that there may be a paradigm shift in UAS 
design in terms of hazard reduction precedence. Through better sensor data fusion, less 
effort may be focused on developing redundant designs (Step 1) or safety devices (Step 
2). Instead, better diagnostics or prognostics algorithms may be developed to ensure that 
the UAS will always be able to detect (or even predict) a fault condition and execute safe 
recovery actions. 
 
 
Figure 4 – Hazard Reduction Precedence [AFSC, 2000] 
 
 
2.4.3 Unmanned Aerial Systems Safety by Mass Classification – Ground Impact 
Hazard Analysis 
The severity definitions (refer to Table 2) related to occupants of the aircraft do not apply 
to an unmanned system. In UAS operation, the most severe possible outcomes are those 
that result in injury to the general public, either in other aircraft or on the ground. Ground 
impact can endanger the general public, and midair collision with a manned aircraft can 
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threaten the safety of the passengers aboard that aircraft. Both effects are critical system 
design drivers that have implications for UAS operations and reliability requirement. In this 
section, a ground impact hazard analysis conducted by MIT is presented [Weibel and 
Hansman, 2005]. The ground impact model considers varying risk of ground impact across 
the entire CONUS area based on population density. An UAS accident ‘exposes’ the general 
public to potential harm, but does not necessarily directly result in a fatality. In simplified 
terms, the model considered an average area of exposure for which the accident has effects 
(which can be considered as the lethal debris area), estimated by the term Aexp – which is 
determined by the UAS class based on its frontal area. In addition, the UAS accident must 
also penetrate sheltering, such as houses and vehicles, before coming into contact with 
persons. The proportion of time that the debris will penetrate shelter given exposure is 
modeled by the penetration factor, Ppen. It is assumed that if debris penetrates sheltering, then 
a fatality has occurred. The ground impact model was applied to six UAS from the Heavy, 
HALE (High Altitude Long Endurance), MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance), 
Tactical, Mini and Micro classifications. Table 3 summarizes the parameters of the model. 
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Table 3 – UAS Classes for Ground Impact Analysis [Weibel and Hansman, 2005] 
 
 
 
 
The objective of the analysis was to calculate the target level of reliability for each UAV 
class in order to meet an assumed target level of safety of 10-7 fatalities per hour of UAS 
operation. The study concluded that there is an increase in required reliability of the UAS 
as vehicle mass increases. This implied that the inherent risk of operating a heavier UAS 
is higher when addressing ground impact hazards. Specifically for HALE UAVs, they 
would need to meet reliability levels of current manned military or general aviation aircraft, 
on the order of 100,000 hr between accidents, to overfly 20% of the country at the target 
level of safety.  
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This study established a direct relationship between the weight of a UAS and its inherent 
operating risk. In addition, it suggested a proxy for this research in terms of target reliability 
to define the airworthiness standard of an UAS.  
2.5 Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis 
FMECA is a procedure for identifying potential failure modes in a system and classifying them 
according to their severity. A FMECA is usually carried out progressively in two parts. The first 
part identifies failure modes and their effects (also known as failure modes and effects analysis). 
The second part ranks the failure modes according to the combination of their severity and the 
probability of occurrence (criticality analysis) [DoD, 2005]. A general approach for conducting a 
FMECA is shown in Figure 5. The steps listed are self-explanatory. However, a distinction needs 
to be made between determining the severity of a failure mode, and the failure mode criticality. 
The latter is a function of severity, the frequency of occurrence of a failure mode, and the 
probability that it will be detected in time to preclude its impact at the system level. This 
criticality analysis resulted in the determination of the risk priority number (RPN) as a metric for 
evaluation. RPN can be expressed as  
RPN = (severity rating) x (frequency rating) x (probability of detection rating) 
The RPN reflects failure-mode criticality; and on inspection, one can see that a failure mode with 
a high frequency of occurrence, with significant impact on system performance, and that is 
difficult to detect is likely to have a high RPN [Blanchard, 2004].  
 
FMECA evaluations form the basis of the architecture – and the analysis results will determine 
the performance requirements of individual subsystems and components in achieving defined 
airworthiness standards. 
   
 
23 
 
 
Figure 5 – General Approach to Conducting a FMECA [Blanchard, 2004] 
 
2.5.1 Preliminary Hazard Assessment of Generic UAS 
NASA published a report in 2007 that identified the typical failure conditions of a UAS 
based on functional decomposition of a generic UAS [Hayhurst et al., 2007]. The full 
functional decomposition is relatively large, with 69 functions at the lowest level under 
the major functions of aviate, navigate, communicate and mitigate. Figure 6 shows the 
top-level view of these functions.  
• Aviate includes not only actions involved in flying the aircraft, but also actions for 
moving the aircraft on the ground, providing command and control, and managing 
sub-systems.  
• Navigate includes actions involved in the management and execution of a flight 
plan.  
• Communicate provides functionality for the communication between the UAS, 
ATC and other aircraft. All actions associated with the command and control link 
to the vehicle are contained within the Aviate category.  
Feedback and Correction Loop
Determine Effects of Failure
Identify Failure Detection Means
Rate Failure Mode Severity
Rate Failure Mode Frequency
Rate Failure Mode Detection Probability
Analyze Failure Mode Criticality
Define System Requirements
Accomplish Functional Analysis
Accomplish Requirements Allocation
Identify Failure Modes
Determine Causes of Failure
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• Mitigate includes actions such as avoiding traffic, avoiding ground objects, 
avoiding weather or other types of environmental effects, and handling 
contingencies. 
 
Figure 6 – Top-Level View of UAS Functional Decomposition [Hayhurst et al., 2007] 
 
The primary safety goal of the failure hazard assessment is to avoid any UAS-initiated 
decrease in the safety of the National Air Space (NAS). As a result, failure condition 
criticality is determined by its effect on people on ground or in other aircraft. The latter 
case includes stress or injury to occupants of other aircraft as a result of an evasive 
maneuver. Damage to material assets is out-of-scope, unless it affects human safety. The 
assessment was applied to 69 different functions (that equated to the 69 leaf nodes of the 
functional decomposition). Figure 7 shows the total number of failure conditions by the 
four major categories in the functional decomposition. The majority of potential failure 
conditions fall under the Aviate or Mitigate functions. Figure 8 presents the same data, 
with detail regarding the number of failure conditions per severity level. 
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Figure 7 – Failure Condition Totals by Functional Category [Hayhurst et al., 2007] 
 
 
Figure 8 – Failure Condition Severities by Functional Category [Hayhurst et al., 2007] 
 
 
The majority of failure conditions with catastrophic and hazardous consequences are 
found in the Aviate and Mitigate functions. In the assessment by NASA, twenty-six 
potentially catastrophic failure conditions were identified, considering only single failures 
in the en-route phase of flight. An interesting observation to make at this point is how the 
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number of catastrophic failure conditions for a generic UAS compares with those 
numbers assumed for commercial transport aircraft and for general aviation aircraft. 
According to AC 23.1309-1C1, there are ten catastrophic failure conditions assumed for a 
general aviation aircraft (covering single and multiple failures over all phases of flight); 
and there are 100 catastrophic failure conditions assumed for a commercial transport 
aircraft according to AC 25.1309-1A 2 . While recognizing that these are broad 
generalizations, preliminary indications are that the number of potential catastrophic 
failure conditions for a generic UAS will be greater than the number for general aviation 
aircraft; and the relation of the estimate to commercial transport aircraft will have to 
depend on further assessment of failure conditions in all phases of flight.  
 
Understanding the functional decomposition of a generic UAS and the potential failure 
conditions aids in this research by providing the top-level functional failure modes for 
analysis. 
2.6 Benefits of the Ideal ISHM System 
The preceding section discussed the development and applications of system health 
management in recent years. At present, health management is already part of the 
standard performance and maintenance paradigms in the propulsion and rotorcraft arenas. 
Although its influence is steadily growing, health management (or pure monitoring?) is 
                                                 
1 FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 23.1309-1C – Equipment, Systems, and Installations in Part 23 Airplanes. 
Date Issued: 12 Mar 1999. Currently superseded by AC 23.1309-1E issued on 17 Nov 2011. 
2 FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 25.1309-1A – System Design and Analysis. Date Issued: 21 Jun 1988. 
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still viewed primarily as a means for detecting damage and/or failures in support of 
maintenance activities; with health management systems being an ‘after-thought’ of 
system designs. This led to the development of health management systems focused on 
individual components of subsystems with data generated being typically viewed only 
within the context of that subsystem. Yet, it is a common belief that integrated system 
health management offers far more benefits than is being envisioned currently 
[MacConnell, 2006].  
 
2.6.1 Benefit Classes 
In a collaborative research effort with the Air Force, industry and academia, MacConnell 
categorized the benefits of ISHM in the following four classes [MacConnell, 2006]. 
These classes presented potential areas within the ISHM architecture where Measures of 
Performance (MOP) or Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) can be defined. 
 
Mission Availability — These benefits encompass all aspects of ISHM that involve 
getting a system ready for mission launch from in-flight fault diagnostics triggering a 
maintenance action to ground check-out. Go/No-go decision making based on knowledge 
of remaining time to failure. This category includes conventional Condition Based 
Maintenance (CBM) and is geared towards making sure the vehicle is ready to perform 
its mission when assigned. These scenarios are heavily dependent on diagnostics, 
remaining life assessments and automation and communication. 
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Mission Success — This category encompasses all scenarios that result in a platform 
being able to accomplish its mission after “launch” regardless of in-flight faults, failures 
or damage sustained during the mission. This deals primarily with real-time vehicle state 
sensing and autonomous decision-making during a mission in particular dealing with in- 
flight faults/events. 
 
Mission Capability — This category focuses on the potential of new capabilities to 
improve performance. This category in particular includes new approaches to integrating 
differing subsystems to generate new abilities. It also addresses the development and 
exploitation of theater-wide ISHM based planning and execution. 
 
Design Paradigm — This category addresses the indirect benefits or those benefits 
which are enabled by ISHM; and these benefits are not necessarily reflected in the war-
fighters experience of the platform but rather in the process of the design and 
manufacture of the system. This benefit class includes concepts such as dramatically 
reduced factors of safety for design and revolutionary certification processes. 
 
2.6.2 The ISHM Business Case – Condition Based Maintenance 
Though the benefits of ISHM are well recognized, the most quantifiable benefits in the 
current paradigm were almost exclusively reported in terms of maintenance related 
savings. Maintenance policies generally define two types of maintenance: 
• Time Based Maintenance (TBM), also known as scheduled/preventive 
maintenance where components are replaced at specified intervals to preclude 
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failures during operation. Due to design especially in cases where redundancy is 
absent, stringent and conservative replacement intervals are implemented way 
before a component’s actual failure. 
• Condition Based Maintenance (CBM), also known as unscheduled/corrective 
maintenance where components are replaced upon detection of an unsatisfactory 
condition – such as those detected (or even predicted) by an ISHM system. 
Every component has a safe life or operating life, beyond which continued operation of 
the component could result in catastrophic failures. In a TBM maintenance policy, there 
is potential for wastage should a component be replaced way ahead of its life expiration. 
With the potential of increased health management and surveillance presented by ISHM, 
the useful life of a component can be extended until diagnostic or prognostic algorithms 
decide that an impending failure is imminent. The algorithms will have to consider the 
uncertainty and confidence levels regarding a component’s useful life in order not to 
encroach upon the unsafe operating window. The concept of savings through a CBM 
philosophy can be illustrated by Figure 9.  
A CBM life cycle cost model can be incorporated within the analytic architecture for a 
cost-benefit analysis of an ISHM-enabled UAS.  
 
 
 
Figure 9 – Illustration of Savings from Condition Based Maintenance 
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The literature also presented potential benefits in the following areas that strengthen the 
business case of ISHM, as summarized in Table 4 [MacConnell, 2006]. 
 
Table 4 – The ISHM Business Case [MacConnell, 2006] 
 
The ISHM Business Case of Today 
Maintenance Time Savings 
 Direct cost/time savings due to proper diagnosis, reduction in scheduled maintenance and reduction in inspection time. 
False Alarm Avoidance 
 Direct cost/time savings due to elimination of unnecessary maintenance; arising from Cannot Duplicate (CND) and Retest OK (RTOK) cases. 
Availability Improvement 
 Direct benefit due to downtime elimination. 
Spares and Supply Savings 
 Direct cost/time savings due to knowing what is needed and when it is needed. 
Recurring Cost Savings 
 Strict cost savings due to health management. 
The ISHM Business Case of Tomorrow 
A fully ISHM enabled system will cost only 70% of a comparable conventional system for equivalent 
capability 
 50% reduction in support costs due to false alarm, CND and RTOK elimination, minimized diagnostic time and reduction of unnecessary maintenance. 
 
10% reduction in Acquisition costs due to reduced conservatism in design due to relaxed safety 
margins with increased real-time status knowledge, and reduced redundancy resulting in reduced 
weight. 
 4% reduction in required fleet size based on ability to do more with less due to increased availability,  reduced abort and cancellation rates, and increased endurance and range. 
A fully ISHM enabled design will be able to produce at least 15% more completed missions over any given 
time period than a conventional system. 
A fully ISHM enabled design will be able to reduce the system attrition rate by over 10% compared to a 
conventional system. 
Fully integrated health management can lead to dramatic reductions in weight, cost, design and 
development flow time, certification and qualification time and cost.  Not to mention changing the 
fundamental paradigm driving the way systems are designed. 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
2.6.3 The ISHM Technology Development Roadmap 
The research conducted by MacConnell also proposed follow-on ISHM capability 
planning in the form of an ISHM Capabilities Roadmap. Refer to Figure 10. This serves 
as a foundation for which ISHM related research efforts can be focused and provided an 
impetus for this thesis effort. The architecture developed through this research aimed to 
validate the business case of ISHM through improved mission availability (with CBM) 
and improved mission success (with improved safety of UAS). In the longer term, the 
FMECA architecture proposed could also be utilized in UAS design paradigms.  
 
This will be consistent with the objective of this research in deriving performance 
requirements for components of an ISHM-enabled UAS for airworthiness certification. 
 
 
Figure 10 – ISHM Capabilities Roadmap [MacConnell, 2006] 
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2.7 Successful Practice of Simulation Experiments 
Simulation is a powerful tool for evaluation and analysis of new system architecture and 
designs, modifications to existing designs and proposed changes to operational rules. 
Conducting a valid simulation experiment is both an art and a science. As a systems 
engineer, it is important to recognize that the success of simulations involved much more 
than the technical aspects that one has been trained in. This section presents the common 
pitfalls in performing simulation studies and identifies approaches for avoiding them 
[Sadowski and Grabau, 2004]. 
  
2.7.1 What is Success? 
First and foremost, a successful simulation project is one that delivers useful information 
at the appropriate time to support a meaningful decision. 
 
The Right Information – presenting information from the perspective of the decision 
makers, in the proper context of what they will be doing with this information to deliver 
value to the proposition. 
 
The Right Timing – intuitively, a high-fidelity answer that is too late to influence a 
decision is not nearly as good as a rough estimate that is in time to help. In addition, 
preliminary insights always serve their purpose in a project for decision makers to steer 
their focus. 
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The Right Decision – this aspect may not be within your span of control, but on-time 
information needs to be delivered to the right person in the right context for the right 
decision to be made. 
 
2.7.2 Pitfalls 
Table 5 summarizes the potential pitfalls faced in simulation projects as presented by 
Sadowski and Garbau. 
 
Table 5 – Common Pitfalls of Simulation Projects [Sadowski and Garbau, 2004] 
 
Tackling the Wrong Problem 
 Step back and double check that simulation is the best tool for the problem 
 Ill-defined scope that might be too ambitious 
Working on the Right Problem at the Wrong Time 
 Designers are still considering widely differing ideas 
 Fundamental systemic problems not resolved 
 Late request – panic call for information 
Missing the Warning Signs of ‘Data Woes’ 
 More often, too little data is available for simulation – or getting the required data might be time consuming. Important to establish data needs early 
 Too much data – identifying valid and accurate data from multiple sources 
Letting the Window of Opportunity Close 
 Getting lost in detail – adding too much details into the simulation just because you could 
 Leaving analysis till the end – unable to draw valuable conclusions from simulation results 
 Having too much fun with animation – distracted with the software tool itself 
 Testing only at the end of a project – validation and verification should be a continuous process throughout the project 
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2.7.3 Approach to Avoid Pitfalls 
The final part of this section lists a few simple habits (applicable in all projects) that help 
to circumvent the above-mentioned pitfalls [Sadowski and Grabau, 2004]. These may 
seem intuitive to all readers but internalizing these habits amidst external demands, 
pressures and distractions may be challenging. 
• Establish a clear focus; 
• Plan carefully and thoroughly; 
• Build a realistic timeline; 
• Constantly review and reassess. 
 
This research will employ a discrete-event simulation to implement the analytic 
architecture. Being aware of the potential pitfalls of a simulation project and the various 
approaches to mitigate them serve as constant beacons in ensuring a positive outcome 
for this research. 
2.8 Literature Review Summary 
This section presented the existing state of ISHM implementation through its various 
definitions and applications. Following which, a typical ISHM architecture was presented 
with the following elements: a sensor suite that detects/identifies critical system 
conditions, a management component that included sensor data processing, diagnostic 
and prognostic algorithms to identify current or incipient faults, and a reasoner to select 
the appropriate mitigation steps to execute. Key airworthiness and system safety concepts 
aligned to the Air Force’s safety objectives were also presented; with specific focus on 
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UAS safety in terms of a ground impact analysis. The FMECA methodology was also 
introduced and a preliminary hazard assessment conducted by NASA on a generic UAS 
was also presented. The review proceeded to recognize the benefits of an ideal ISHM 
system and highlighted the business case and ISHM capabilities roadmap to substantiate 
follow-on ISHM research efforts. Finally, the last section of the literature review 
discussed the potential pitfalls and mitigating approach of a simulation experiment, which 
would be the methodology employed to validate the proposed architecture of this thesis. 
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III. Architecture Definition 
3.1 Overview 
This chapter describes the analytic architecture that provides the basis of the discrete 
event simulation model. The architecture is developed in accordance with the Department 
of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF). The chapter provides a preview through 
the concept of operations for the analytic architecture.  Thereafter, specific architectural 
products that are of relevance to the simulation model are created. Finally, the 
architecture is translated to logical flows pertaining to the implementation of the 
simulation model.  
3.2 Concept of Operations 
3.2.1 Issue 
A. Problem Statement 
As presented in the literature review, health management at present is still viewed 
primarily as a means for detecting fault and/or failures in support of maintenance 
activities; with health management systems being an ‘after-thought’ of system designs. 
This led to the development of health management systems focused on individual 
components of subsystems with data generated being typically viewed only within the 
context of that subsystem. An ISHM architecture for analysis of UAS failure modes will 
provide a means for initial airworthiness certification of ISHM-enabled UAS designs – 
by determining performance requirements of subsystems or components.  
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B. Purpose of the CONOPS 
The purpose of this CONOPS is to articulate how the architecture will enhance 
airworthiness (and other secondary benefits) through the analysis of failure modes of a 
generic UAV. Specifically, these are the research questions that the architecture aims to 
answer: 
(1) What are the performance characteristics of ISHM to ensure continued 
airworthiness of the UAS?  
(2) How will ISHM provide a business case to improve the level of UAS self-
autonomy? 
(3) What are the potential impacts of ISHM to maintenance practices and life 
cycle costs? 
 
3.2.2 Overview 
A. Synopsis 
The proposed architecture shall optimize existing UAS designs through the incorporation 
of a typical ISHM configuration (i.e. sensors suite, diagnostic/prognostic algorithms and 
a decision reasoner). With available FMECA data in terms of possible failure conditions 
as input, the architecture will then evaluate the effectiveness of ISHM in terms of its 
resultant reliability over the lifetime of the UAS. The architecture will also consider the 
degradation of the ISHM suite in terms of missed detection and false alarm rates and their 
effects on maintenance policies. The implementation of the analytic architecture for 
ISHM-enabled UAS shall provide basis for:  
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(i) initial airworthiness certification during UAS induction, 
(ii) continued airworthiness certification when field reliability data are available, 
and 
(iii) change in maintenance policies and potential benefits in terms of increased 
availability and cost savings. 
 
B. Description of Military Challenge 
Besides quantitative benefits in terms of system availability, mission success and related 
cost savings, ISHM presents mid- and long-term benefits in the design paradigm through 
expansion of operational envelopes, reduced safety factors and revolutionary certification 
techniques. In seeking to improve the trust in autonomy of UAS, this analytic architecture 
shall examine the target reliability of an ISHM-enabled UAS over its lifetime. 
 
C. Desired Effects 
The architecture shall provide a baseline analytical model for a generic UAS. Various 
failure conditions, their failure probability distributions and assigned criticalities provide 
inputs for the analysis. ISHM effectiveness can be modeled through the strength of its 
diagnostics and prognostics algorithms, i.e. probability of an accurate ISHM deduction. 
On the other hand, ISHM degradation is compared against established thresholds of false 
alarms and missed detections. Output and sensitivity analysis on measures of 
performance, such as UAS life expectancy and cost of maintenance over its lifetime, can 
then be performed to determine ideal performance requirements and maintenance policies 
for specific UAS designs.  
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3.2.3 Context 
A. Time Horizon 
The architecture and preliminary analysis should be completed by end July 2013 with the 
research out-brief scheduled in end Aug 2013. The ISHM technology relevant to the 
implementation of this analytic model should be available in the next 5 to 15 years. 
 
B. Assumptions 
(i) Without actual FMECA data, it will not be possible to model and/or evaluate 
all the failure modes for a typical UAS. As such, only selected critical sub-
system failures affecting airworthiness of the UAS shall be evaluated using 
the model. 
(ii) Without actual sensor performance data, theoretical/nominal thresholds will 
need to be assumed to model sensor degradation in terms of False Alarm Rate 
(FAR) and missed detections. 
 
C. Risks 
Absence of real-world UAS design data may raise uncertainties on the accuracy of the 
output metrics. However, this research seeks to establish a sound analytical architecture 
that would serve its intended benefits through appropriate sensitivity analyses. 
 
3.2.4 Employment Concept 
A. Critical Capabilities 
The critical capabilities needed to meet the desired end state of this architecture include: 
(i) Flexibility – able to be further customized for specific UAS configurations 
with associated FMECA. 
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(ii) Analysis Support – regardless of evaluation/simulation tool, the architecture 
will be able to support the associated software analysis and evaluation to yield 
useful results.  
 
B. Enabling Capabilities 
In order to better implement the architecture, a formal Failure Mode, Effect, and 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) must be performed on the UAS. This is an iterative 
process throughout the System Life Cycle that identifies failure modes, assesses their 
probabilities of occurrence, criticalities and their effects on the system. The results of the 
FMECA should identify critical sub-systems or components that ISHM needs to monitor 
and/or control; and guide the diagnostic and prognostic algorithms required for effective 
health management. 
 
C. End State 
A system-wide analytic architecture for an ISHM-enabled generic UAS – capable of 
delivering design decisions based on failure modes of UAS, which in turn ensures 
continued airworthiness of UAS operations. 
3.3 Architecture Views 
3.3.1 Operational Activity Decomposition Tree (OV-5a) 
Figure 11: Describes the operational activities organized in a hierarchical structure. 
There are two top-level operational activities for the architecture; namely “Perform 
Generic UAS Activities” and “Perform ISHM”. The former is applicable to all UAS and 
decomposes into lower-level activities such as “Perform Top-Level UAS In-Flight 
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Functions” – Aviate, Navigate, Communicate and Mitigate [Hayhurst et al., 2007], 
“Perform Failure Detection” and “Perform Failure Assessment”. In addition, a generic 
UAS upon confirmation of failure, will “Perform Subsystem Maintenance” upon landing. 
The analytic architecture will also need to “Record UAS Operational Lifetime” to 
determine scheduled maintenance requirements and more importantly, the accumulated 
life expectancy of the UAS. 
 
The top-level operational activity – “Perform ISHM” is only applicable for ISHM-
enabled UAS. It decomposes into two lower-level activities – “Perform Diagnostics and 
Prognostics Assessment” determines the accuracy and effectiveness of ISHM algorithms, 
while “Perform ISHM Maintenance” repairs/replaces ISHM components when false 
alarm and missed detection thresholds are exceeded.  
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3.3.2 Operational Rules Model (OV-6a) 
Table 6: Describes the business rules that constrain operations for an ISHM-enabled 
UAS. 
Based on the results of the various conditions listed in the “Condition Stub”, each of the 
19 operational rules determines a set of specific actions in the “Action Stub” to be 
executed by the simulation. 
 
Table 6 – OV-6a: Operational Rules Model (ISHM-Enabled UAS) 
 
 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 R15 R16 R17 R18 R19
Failure Occurred? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N N
Is Failure Detected by Isolated Subsystem Sensor? Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N
Is Failure Ascertained by ISHM? Y N N N N Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N
Is Failure Catastrophic? - Y - N N - - Y - N
Is Failure Latent (occurred in previous flights but not 
detected/ascertained)?
- - Y N N - - - Y N
Is Sensor Miss Rate Exceeded? N - - N N Y N - - N - - - - - - - - -
Is Sensor False Alarm Rate Exceeded? N - - - - - - - - - Y Y N N Y N N N N
Is ISHM Miss Rate Exceeded? N - - Y N N N - - N - - - - - - - - -
Is ISHM False Alarm Rate Exceeded? N - - - - - - - - - Y N Y N N N Y N N
Action Stub
A13.2 Assess Failure Severity X X X X X X X X X X
A13.3 Assign Failure Latency X
A13.4 Assess Latency Effect X X X X X X X X X X
UAS Recovering Code 1
[A11.1 Aviate - No Discrepancy Reported]
X X
UAS Recovering Code 2 
[A11.1 Aviate - Minor Discrepancy Reported But Does Not 
Affect Current Mission]
X X X X
UAS Recovering Code 3 
[A11.4 Mitigate - Discrepancy Reported that Require 
Rectification Before Next Mission]
X X X X X X X X X
UAS Mishap 
[A15.2 Record UAS Accumulated Life - Terminated]
X X X X
A12.2 Determine Sensor Missed Detection Rate 
[After increasing count]
X X X X
A12.3 Determine Sensor False Alarm Rate
[after increasing count]
X X X X X X
A21.2 Determine ISHM Missed Detection Rate
[after increasing count]
X X X X X X
A21.3 Determine ISHM False Alarm Rate
[after increasing count]
X X X X X X
A14.4 Troubeshoot for Cannot Duplicate (CND) X X X X X X X X
A14.7 Record CND Count and Troubleshooting Downtime X X X X X X
A14.2 Replace Failed Component X X X X X
A14.3 Replace Faulty Sensor X X X X
A22.1 Perform Unscheduled ISHM Maintenance X X X X
A15.1 Determine Flight Time Based on Landing Codes
[Normal Flight Time for Codes 1 and 2]
X X X X X X
A15.1 Determine Flight Time Based on Landing Codes
[Reduced Flight Time for Code 3 and Mishap]
X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Notes:
1) '-' in Condition Matrix indicates condition does not matter  for recommended set of actions.
2) 'X' in Action Matrix indicates specified actions to be carried out or transition into pre-defined states based on conditions.
Action Matrix
Condition Stub
Determine Maintenance Requirements of ISHM
Rules and Decision Analysis Table (ISHM-Enabled UAS)
Condition Matrix
Determine if Failure Condition is Present During Flight
Determine if UAS is Aware of Present Failure Condition
Determine Maintenance Requirements of Existing Sensors
Assess Failure Severity and Latency Effect
Perform Failure Assessment
Decide UAS Recovery State
Perform Required Maintenance
Record UAS Operational and Maintenance Life
Degradation of Isolated Subsystem Sensors
Degradation of ISHM Suite
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Table 7: Describes the business rules that constrain operations for a non-ISHM UAS. 
Based on the results of the various conditions listed in the “Condition Stub”, each of the 
12 operational rules determines a set of specific actions in the “Action Stub” to be 
executed by the simulation. With a non-ISHM UAS, fewer conditions and actions exist 
due to absence of an ISHM failure (or non-failure) declaration and the associated ISHM 
maintenance actions, therefore there will be fewer rules than an ISHM-enabled UAS. 
 
Table 7 – OV-6a: Operational Rules Model (Non-ISHM UAS) 
 
 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12
Failure Occurred? Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N
Is Failure Detected by Isolated Subsystem Sensor? Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y N N
Is Failure Catastrophic? - - Y - N N
Is Failure Latent (occurred in previous flights but not 
detected/ascertained)?
- - - Y N N
Is Sensor False Alarm Rate Exceeded? - - - - - - Y Y N N N N
Is UAS Due for Scheduled Maintenance? Y N - - Y N Y N Y N Y N
Action Stub
A13.2 Assess Failure Severity X X X X X X
A13.3 Assign Failure Latency X
A13.4 Assess Latency Effect X X X X X X
UAS Recovering Code 1
[A11.1 Aviate - No Discrepancy Reported]
X X X X
UAS Recovering Code 3 
[A11.4 Mitigate - Discrepancy Reported that Require 
Rectification Before Next Mission]
X X X X X X
UAS Mishap
[A15.2 Record UAS Accumulated Life - Terminated]
X X
A12.3 Determine Sensor False Alarm Rate
[after increasing count]
X X X X
A14.4 Troubeshoot for Cannot Duplicate (CND) X X X X
A14.7 Record CND Count and Troubleshooting Downtime X X X X
A14.1 Perform Scheduled Maintenance (Without ISHM)
[Reset Maintenance Schedule]
X X X X X
A14.2 Replace Failed Component X X
A14.3 Replace Faulty Sensor X X
A15.1 Determine Flight Time Based on Landing Codes
[Normal Flight Time for Codes 1 and 2]
X X X X
A15.1 Determine Flight Time Based on Landing Codes
[Reduced Flight Time for Code 3 and Mishap]
X X X X X X X X
A15.3 Determine Time for Scheduled Maintenance
[Add Flight Time to Maintenance Schedule]
X X X X
Notes:
1) '-' in Condition Matrix indicates condition does not matter  for recommended set of actions.
2) 'X' in Action Matrix indicates specified actions to be carried out or transition into pre-defined states based on conditions.
Assess Failure Severity and Latency Effect
Rules and Decision Analysis Table (Non-ISHM UAS)
Condition Stub
Condition Matrix
Determine if Failure Condition is Present During Flight
Determine if UAS is Aware of Present Failure Condition
Perform Required Maintenance
Record UAS Operational and Maintenance Life
Determine Maintenance Requirements of Existing Sensors
Determine Scheduled Maintenance Requirements of UAS
Action Matrix
Perform Failure Assessment
Decide UAS Recovery State
Degradation of Isolated Subsystem Sensors
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3.3.3 State Transition Description (OV-6b) 
Figure 12: Describes the business process (activity) responses to presence of failure 
condition. 
This state transition diagram provides a temporal view of the analytic architecture in the 
event of a failure condition. The left-hand side (LHS) of the diagram depicts the state 
transition of an ISHM-enabled UAS while the right-hand side (RHS) shows the 
corresponding state transition of a non-ISHM UAS. Consistent with the operational rules 
presented in the OV-6a, the architecture transits through the various states based on the 
presented conditions. These states include the UAS recovering with various landing 
codes based on failure detection by the subsystem sensors and failure determination by 
ISHM (LHS). In addition, based on the landing codes, appropriate maintenance actions 
on the subsystem and/or ISHM are executed. Specifically for a non-ISHM UAS, there is 
provision for scheduled maintenance. In the event that the failure condition is not 
detected (by both the subsystem sensor and ISHM), the model transits into a state to 
determine the latency effect of the missed failure condition. If a missed failure condition 
is catastrophic or latent (to the extent that it becomes critical), the model terminates with 
a UAS mishap. 
 
Figure 13: Describes the business process (activity) responses to absence of failure 
condition. 
This state transition diagram provides a temporal view of the analytic architecture in the 
absence of a failure condition. Without actual failures, this model does not result in a 
UAS mishap. However, this view will be more concerned with false alarms and Cannot-
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Duplicate (CND) that generate unnecessary maintenance activities. Otherwise, the states 
presented in both state transition diagrams are similar. 
 
 
Figure 12  – OV-6b: State Transition Description (Failure Condition Present) 
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Figure 13  – OV-6b: State Transition Description (Failure Condition Absent) 
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3.4 Discrete Event Simulation Model 
3.4.1 Logic Flow 
Based on the analytic architecture, flowcharts are drawn up to present the logical 
sequence that guide the development of the simulation model. Four logical sequences are 
presented in the following figures. 
• Failure Condition Present for an ISHM-Enabled UAS: Refer to Figure 14. 
• Failure Condition Present for a Non-ISHM UAS: Refer to Figure 15. 
• Failure Condition Absent for an ISHM-Enabled UAS: Refer to Figure 16. 
• Failure Condition Absent for a Non-ISHM UAS: Refer to Figure 17. 
 
3.4.2 Model Parameters 
Input modeling and output analysis are two important phases of a simulation project. 
Based on the model logic, the required input parameters and desired output performance 
measures are defined in Table 8. 
 
3.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis – Design of Experiments (DOE) 
The benefits of this research effort will be based on the analysis of the simulation results. 
Representative data for a UAS will be fed into the model and DOE techniques will be 
employed to determine situations where the life expectancy of an ISHM-enabled UAS 
can be maximized based on the various UAS design factors. The secondary objective of 
the analysis will be to establish a business case for ISHM by minimizing the cost of a 
condition-based maintenance program with onboard ISHM. 
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Figure 14  – Simulation Model Flowchart: Failure Condition Present for an ISHM-Enabled UAS 
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Figure 15  – Simulation Model Flowchart: Failure Condition Present for a Non-ISHM UAS 
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Figure 16  – Simulation Model Flowchart: Failure Condition Absent for an ISHM-Enabled UAS 
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Figure 17  – Simulation Model Flowchart: Failure Condition Absent for a Non-ISHM UAS 
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Table 8 – Simulation Model Parameters 
 
UAS Properties 
(Input Parameters) Definition 
P(Failure) The probability of a failure occurring for a given sortie. 
P(Failure is Catastrophic) Given that a failure occurs, the probability of it being catastrophic, i.e. resulting in mishap if undetected. 
Latency Threshold 
The accumulated latency effect that determines criticality of a failure condition 
every time it is not detected in previous flights. A latent failure that reaches its 
pre-determined Latency Threshold due to prior missed detections will be 
upgraded to a catastrophic failure resulting in a mishap – such as in the case of 
a crack propagating beyond its critical crack length. 
P(Sensor Detection) The probability of the sensor detecting a failure given that a failure condition exists. 
P(Sensor False Alarm) The probability of the sensor detecting a failure given that there is no failure condition. 
Sensor Missed Detection 
Threshold 
The performance specification of the sensor in terms of missed detections; 
exceeding which sensor maintenance is to be carried out. 
Sensor False Alarm 
Threshold 
The performance specification of the sensor in terms of false alarms; exceeding 
which sensor maintenance is to be carried out. 
Scheduled Maintenance 
Interval For a non-ISHM UAS, the interval between scheduled maintenance (in hours). 
Sortie Flight Time 
(Normal) 
The duration of flight (in hours) for a UAS mission that recovered Code 1 or 
Code 2. 
Sortie Flight Time 
(Reduced) 
The truncated duration of flight (in hours) for a UAS mission that recovered 
Code 3. 
ISHM Properties 
(Input Parameters) Definition 
P(ISHM Confidence) 
The probability of ISHM declaring that a failure condition has occurred when 
an actual failure condition exists – an indication of the strength of the 
diagnostic and prognostic algorithms. 
P(ISHM False Alarm) The probability of ISHM declaring that a failure condition has occurred when there is no actual failure. 
ISHM Missed Detection 
Threshold 
The performance specification of ISHM in terms of missed detections; 
exceeding which ISHM maintenance is to be carried out. 
ISHM False Alarm 
Threshold 
The performance specification of ISHM in terms of false alarms; exceeding 
which ISHM maintenance is to be carried out. 
Expected Model 
Output Measures Definition 
Expected System 
Lifetime 
The expected lifetime of the UAS (in hours) based on accumulation of 
airworthy sorties. 
Number of CND The expected number of Cannot-Duplicate (CND) cases that contribute to unnecessary maintenance. 
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Scheduled Maintenance 
Actions The expected number of scheduled maintenance actions for a non-ISHM UAS. 
Unscheduled 
Maintenance Actions The expected number of component replacements due to actual failures. 
Sensor Maintenance 
Actions 
The expected number of sensor maintenance actions due to exceedance of 
missed detection and false alarm thresholds. 
ISHM Maintenance 
Actions 
The expected number of ISHM maintenance actions due to exceedance of 
missed detection and false alarm thresholds. 
UAS Downtime This is a calculated parameter based on fixed maintenance times for the above categories of maintenance actions. 
Model Properties Definition 
Number of Iterations The number of iterations to execute the simulation model to achieve greater statistical accuracy. 
 
3.5 Concordance and Consistency 
The fundamental principle in architecting lies in ensuring concordance between 
architectural products – so that end-users (customers, builders, architects) looking at 
different products will have a common picture of the desired architecture. In this research 
effort, where the analytic architecture is applied to a simulation model, greater care must 
be taken to ensure consistency between the architecture and the translated logic flow that 
is to be implemented within the simulation model. In order to demonstrate the adherence 
of concordance and consistency principles in the research methodology, this section 
identified a specific logic path from Figure 14, and traced its relevance and consistency 
with the three architectural products presented (refer to Figure 18):   
• OV-5a (Operational Activity Decomposition Tree) – The actions executed within 
the logic path are consistent with defined operational activities; 
• OV-6a (Operational Rules Model) – The actions executed based on decisions 
within the logic path are consistent with the defined operational rule for the 
identified path; 
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• OV-6b (State Transition Description) – The logical sequence presented by the 
logic path is consistent with the defined states, conditions and associated 
operational activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18  – Demonstrating Concordance and Consistency   
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3.6 Architecture Summary 
This chapter defined the architecture for this research originating from the CONOPS that 
drove the relevant analytic architectural products, and subsequently translated into logical 
sequences for the implementation of the simulation model. While various heuristics 
guided the art of architecture, the principle of concordance between products was 
enforced throughout the architecting process – ensuring consistent representation in the 
development of the simulation model. Architecting for the purpose of sound analysis 
provided a well-grounded methodology for this research. 
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IV. Analysis and Results 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter will present the implementation of the analytic architecture using Arena ® 
Version 14.5 3  and the analysis of the discrete event simulation model using 
representative UAS data for both ISHM-enabled and non-ISHM UAS models. 
4.2 Input Modeling 
Input analysis is the process of characterizing input variables – identifying their possible 
values and associated probabilities. Input models provide the driving force for a 
simulation, and identifying the right input variables will form the basis of sensitivity 
analysis at the end of a simulation project. Choosing the appropriate distributions for 
input data is a major task, as faulty models will lead to outputs whose interpretation could 
give rise to misleading recommendations (and follow-on decisions in the worst case) 
[Banks et al., 2010]. The challenge in this research lies in the fact that real-world data 
were not available; from failure data and baseline sensor qualities of a generic UAS to 
characteristics of an envisioned ISHM suite, in terms of diagnostics and prognostics 
accuracy. Hence, various assumptions were made, in terms of the input parameters, in 
order to derive useful output measures within reasonable boundaries. Table 9 presents the 
input parameters for the discrete-event simulation model. 
                                                 
3  Accessed on 2 August 2013. Student Version 14.5 downloaded from Rockwell Automation, Inc. – 
Arena® website: http://www.arenasimulation.com/Private_Content.aspx?code=727I57H9K24&type=1 
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Table 9 – Simulation Model Input 
 
UAS Properties 
(Input Parameters) Implementation Remarks 
Typical Values for 
Analytic Considerations 
Failure Rate, λ 
The failure rate is the rate at which failures occur 
in a specified time interval. 
 
𝜆 =
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠
 
 
Assumed to be relatively constant during normal 
UAS operation if system design is mature 
[Blanchard, 2004]. The failure rate is usually 
what is presented in FMECA reports, e.g. 1 
failure in 103 hours (or λ = 10-3 failure per hour). 
* Based on suggested 
probability levels defined in 
Table 2 [DoD, 2000].  
 
Typical Values considered: 
10-1, 10-2, 10-3(baseline),  
10-4, and 10-5  
 
Unit: failure per hour. 
P(Failure) 
Probability of failure for a given sortie. Assumed 
to follow an exponential function with constant 
failure rate, λ – calculated by the following 
formula: 
 
𝑃(𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒) = 1 − 𝑒−𝜆∗𝑆𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑒𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 
Dependent on failure rate. 
P(Failure is 
Catastrophic) 
Based on NASA report in 2007, there are 26 
potentially catastrophic failures out of 132 
identified failure conditions for a generic UAS 
[Hayhurst et al., 2007]. 
Fixed Parameter 
 = 26
132
= 0.197 
Latency Threshold 
The accumulated latency effect that determines 
criticality of a failure condition every time it is 
not detected in previous flights. A latent failure 
that reaches its pre-determined Latency Threshold 
due to prior missed detections will be upgraded to 
a catastrophic failure resulting in a mishap. 
 Fixed Parameter = 5 
(Assumed that 5 prior 
missed detections of a non-
catastrophic failure will 
escalate its severity and 
result in a catastrophic 
failure) 
P(Sensor Detection) 
Assumed to be a baseline sensor characteristic for 
generic UAS. Has a positive correlation with 
expected UAS lifetime.  
Typical Values considered: 
0.6, 0.7, 0.8 (baseline),  and 
0.9 
(Assumed to be constant 
over the lifetime of the UAS 
without sensor degradation) 
P(Sensor False Alarm) 
Assumed to be a baseline sensor characteristic for 
generic UAS. Has a positive correlation with 
unscheduled sensor maintenance actions. 
Typical Values considered: 
0.01, 0.02, 0.03 (baseline), 
0.04  and 0.05 
(Assumed to be constant 
over the lifetime of the UAS 
without sensor degradation) 
Sensor Missed 
Detection Threshold 
Assumed to be an arbitrary target threshold to 
carry out sensor maintenance when exceeded; 
should be lower than assumed accumulated 
latency effect to be meaningful. 
Fixed Parameter = 4 
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Sensor False Alarm 
Threshold 
Assumed to be an arbitrary target threshold to 
carry out sensor maintenance when exceeded; 
should be higher that missed detection threshold 
due to no safety of flight concern. 
Fixed Parameter = 10 
Scheduled 
Maintenance Interval 
Only applicable for Non-ISHM UAS, assumed to 
be a fixed interval throughout the life of the UAS. 
Fixed Parameter = 1000 
operating hours 
Sortie Flight Time 
(Normal) Assumed to be constant. 
Fixed Parameter = 10 
hours 
Sortie Flight Time 
(Reduced) 
Assumed flight time to be reduced by 50% for a 
Code 3 mission. 
Fixed Parameter = 0.5 * 
Normal Sortie Flight Time 
= 5 hours 
ISHM Properties 
(Input Parameters) Implementation Remarks 
Fixed Parameter / 
Variable? 
P(ISHM Confidence) 
The probability of ISHM declaring that a failure 
condition has occurred when an actual failure 
condition exists – an indication of the strength of 
the diagnostic and prognostic algorithms. 
Performance specification of ISHM system. Has a 
positive correlation with the expected UAS 
lifetime. 
Typical Values considered: 
0.6, 0.7, 0.8 (baseline),  and 
0.9 
(Assumed to be constant 
over the lifetime of the UAS 
without ISHM  degradation) 
P(ISHM False Alarm) 
The probability of ISHM declaring that a failure 
condition has occurred when there is no actual 
failure. Performance specification of ISHM 
system. Has a positive correlation with 
unscheduled ISHM maintenance actions. 
Typical Values considered: 
0.01, 0.02, 0.03 (baseline), 
0.04  and 0.05 
(Assumed to be constant 
over the lifetime of the UAS 
without ISHM degradation) 
ISHM Missed 
Detection Threshold 
Assumed to be an arbitrary target threshold to 
carry out ISHM maintenance when exceeded; 
should be lower than assumed accumulated 
latency effect to be meaningful. 
Fixed Parameter = 4 
ISHM False Alarm 
Threshold 
Assumed to be an arbitrary target threshold to 
carry out ISHM maintenance when exceeded; 
should be higher that missed detection threshold 
due to no safety of flight concern. 
Fixed Parameter = 10 
 
4.2.1 Assumptions 
• For an ISHM-enabled UAS, the detection outcome by the baseline sensor and the 
eventual declaration by ISHM were assumed to be independent events, with the 
latter being the final authority in failure declaration. However, in a realistic ISHM 
implementation scenario, the declaration results of ISHM will be dependent upon, 
in part, the detection outcome of the baseline sensor(s). The present assumption 
was made due to modeling limitations in conflict resolution techniques between 
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the baseline sensor and ISHM; relaxation of this assumption presents a potential 
area for future research. 
• The probability of failure for the UAS was assumed to follow a constant failure 
rate. Likewise, the baseline sensor and ISHM were modeled to exhibit constant 
probabilities of missed detection and false alarm. Possible improvements to the 
model might consider failure distributions with increasing failure rate exhibiting 
component wear-out, and also sensor and ISHM degradation with time. 
• In typical FMECA designs, failure conditions with greater severity will be 
mitigated with redundancy or better detection devices. However, this model 
assumed fixed probabilities of sensor detection and ISHM confidence regardless 
of the severity of the failure condition. 
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4.3 Model Implementation 
Based on the analytic architecture presented in Chapter III, two separate Arena ® 
simulation models were set up; one for an ISHM-enabled UAS and another for a non-
ISHM UAS. The sequenced actions for the two top-level models are described in the 
following sub-sections. The details of the sub-models implemented within Arena ® are 
also provided in Appendix A. 
 
4.3.1 ISHM-Enabled UAS Simulation Model 
Figure 19 depicts the simulation model path if a failure condition is present, while Figure 
20 refers to the simulation model path if there is no failure. 
 
4.3.1.1 Sequenced Actions for ISHM-Enabled UAS Simulation Model 
• Sorties are generated as model entities – with pre-defined average sortie duration. 
• Probability of failure is calculated based on occurrence rate. 
• The simulation performs a random draw from the failure distribution to determine 
the occurrence of failure for a given sortie. 
• IF failure condition is present (refer to Figure 19), 
o A1.3 Perform Failure Assessment – to determine if failure is catastrophic 
and its latency effect (based on missed detections of past failures). 
o A1.2 Perform Failure Detection – to determine if failure is detected by 
baseline sensor. 
o A2.1 Perform Diagnostics and Prognostics Assessment – to determine if 
failure is ascertained by ISHM. 
o IF failure is missed by ISHM, determine if it will result in a mishap based 
on prior failure assessment. 
 IF mishap results, terminate UAS life. 
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 ELSE IF no mishap results, check status of sensor detection. 
• IF failure is detected by sensor, a Code 2 recovery results 
with an ISHM miss. 
o A22.1 Perform Unscheduled ISHM Maintenance 
based on comparison with ISHM Missed Detection 
Threshold. 
• ELSE IF failure is also not detected by sensor, a Code 1 
recovery results with both ISHM and sensor misses. 
o A13.3 Assign Failure Latency – add latency effect 
to UAS due to missed detection. 
o ELSE IF failure is determined by ISHM, a Code 3 recovery results with an 
unscheduled component replacement action. Then, check status of sensor 
detection. 
 IF failure is missed by sensor, a Code 3 recovery results with a 
sensor miss. 
• A14.3 Perform Unscheduled Sensor Maintenance based on 
comparison with Sensor Missed Detection Threshold. 
 ELSE IF failure is not missed by sensor, a Code 3 recovery results 
with both ISHM and sensor confirmations. 
• ELSE IF failure condition is absent (refer to Figure 20), 
o A1.2 Perform Failure Detection – to determine presence of false alarm by 
baseline sensor. 
o A2.1 Perform Diagnostics and Prognostics Assessment – to determine 
presence of false alarm by ISHM. 
o IF ISHM produces a false alarm, a Code 3 recovery results with a Cannot 
Duplicate (CND). 
 A22.1 Perform Unscheduled ISHM Maintenance based on 
comparison with ISHM False Alarm Threshold.  
 IF sensor produces a false alarm, a Code 3 recovery results with 
both ISHM and sensor false alarms. 
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• A14.3 Perform Unscheduled Sensor Maintenance based on 
comparison with Sensor False Alarm Threshold. 
 ELSE IF sensor does not produce a false alarm, a Code 3 recovery 
results with ISHM false alarm only. 
o ELSE IF ISHM does not produce a false alarm, check status of sensor 
false alarm. 
 IF sensor produces a false alarm, a Code 2 recovery results with 
sensor false alarm only. 
• A14.3 Perform Unscheduled Sensor Maintenance based on 
comparison with Sensor False Alarm Threshold. 
 ELSE IF sensor does not produce a false alarm, a Code 1 recovery 
results – uneventful flight without false alarms. 
• Statistics are collected at the end of each sortie recovery. 
o UAS Expected Lifetime is accumulated through every sortie based on 
sortie durations from different recovery codes. 
o The following categories of maintenance activities are added from 
respective sorties: 
 Unscheduled component replacement; 
 Unscheduled ISHM maintenance actions; 
 Unscheduled sensor maintenance actions. 
• Simulation is terminated whenever a mishap occurs. 
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4.3.2 Non-ISHM UAS Simulation Model 
Figure 21 depicts the simulation model path if a failure condition is present, while Figure 
22 refers to the simulation model path if there is no failure. 
 
4.3.2.1 Sequenced Actions for Non-ISHM UAS Simulation Model 
• Sorties are generated as model entities – with pre-defined average sortie duration. 
• Probability of failure is calculated based on occurrence rate. 
• Define scheduled maintenance interval. 
• The simulation performs a random draw from the failure distribution to determine 
the occurrence of failure for a given sortie. 
• IF failure condition is present (refer to Figure 21), 
o A1.3 Perform Failure Assessment – to determine if failure is catastrophic 
and its latency effect (based on missed detections of past failures). 
o A1.2 Perform Failure Detection – to determine if failure is detected by 
baseline sensor. 
o IF failure is detected by sensor, a Code 3 recovery results with an 
unscheduled component replacement action. 
 Reset maintenance schedule whenever a component replacement 
has been carried out. 
o ELSE IF failure is not detected by sensor, determine if it will result in a 
mishap based on prior failure assessment. 
 IF mishap results, terminate UAS life. 
 ELSE IF no mishap results, a Code 1 recovery results with a sensor 
miss (but this is unknown to the UAS). 
• A13.3 Assign Failure Latency – add latency effect to UAS 
due to missed detection. 
• A14.1 Perform Scheduled Maintenance based on 
comparison with remaining time to scheduled maintenance. 
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• ELSE IF failure condition is absent (refer to Figure 22), 
o A1.2 Perform Failure Detection – to determine presence of false alarm by 
baseline sensor. 
o IF sensor produces a false alarm, a Code 3 recovery results with a Cannot 
Duplicate (CND). 
 A22.1 Perform Unscheduled Sensor Maintenance based on 
comparison with Sensor False Alarm Threshold. 
 A14.1 Perform Scheduled Maintenance based on comparison with 
remaining time to scheduled maintenance. 
o ELSE IF sensor does not produce a false alarm, a Code 1 recovery results 
– uneventful flight without false alarm. 
 A14.1 Perform Scheduled Maintenance based on comparison with 
remaining time to scheduled maintenance. 
• Statistics are collected at the end of each sortie recovery. 
o UAS Expected Lifetime is accumulated through every sortie based on 
sortie durations from different recovery codes. 
o The following categories of maintenance activities are added from 
respective sorties: 
 Unscheduled component replacements; 
 Scheduled maintenance actions; 
 Unscheduled sensor maintenance actions due to false alarms only. 
• Simulation is terminated whenever a mishap occurs. 
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4.3.3 Verification and Validation 
4.3.3.1 Verification – Did I Build the Model Correctly? 
Diligent effort was expended to prove the model wrong.  Numerous iterations were tested 
until errors in design, coding logic, process flows, or concepts were found. The following 
analysis tools were used to test the models and deem them either adequate or incorrect: 
a) Software Debugging Function – A first-cut verification was conducted by using 
the Arena ® debugger to ensure that no coding irregularities or warnings exist for 
the simulation model. 
b) Stress Testing – There were multiple variables modeled with statistical 
distributions or percentage-based decisions within the model. These variables 
were varied using ‘non-realistic’ levels based on experience to ensure logical 
results would be generated. 
c) Animation – This feature that is available within Arena ® was used to trace a 
UAS sortie through the model. Furthermore, animation was used to ensure entities 
did not enter infinite loops or proceed along ‘illogical paths’. 
d) Analytical Method Using Probability Theory – Based on probability theory, 
analytical methods can be employed to verify certain output measures of the 
model. A close approximation of simulation results to analytical values provides 
confidence that the model is accurate. 
 
The following parameters were defined for a test simulation run. 
Table 10 – Test Values for Theoretical Calculation 
 
Parameter Formula or Label Specified or Calculated Value 
Normal Sortie Duration ASD 10 hours 
Failure Occurrence Rate λ 10-6 failure per hour 
Probability of Failure Occurring 
in a Given Sortie PF = 1 – e
-λ*ASD 1 – e-0.000001 * 10 = 9.99995 * 10-6 
Probability of Sensor Detection PSD 0.8 
Probability of ISHM Confidence PIC 0.8 
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Assuming that the above decision processes are independent, probability of a 
failure occurring and being detected by both ISHM and baseline sensor 
= [PF ∩ PSD ∩ PIC]  
= 9.99995 * 10-6 * 0.8 * 0.8 = 6.400 * 10-6 
The same test values from Table 10 were input for the ISHM-enabled UAS 
Arena® model. For the test simulation run, the above probability should be 
approximately equal to: 
Code 3 With Both ISHM and Sensor Con�irmation
Total Sorties Generated
 
From the results of the simulation run over three test replications, the average 
values obtained are: 
Table 11 – Results for Test Simulation Run 
 
Replication 
Code 3 with 
ISHM & Sensor 
Confirmation 
Total Sorties 
Generated 
Code 3 with ISHM & 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
Total Sorties Generated
 
#1 14 2.4370 * 106 5.745 * 10-6 
#2 3 3.3350 * 105 8.996 * 10-6 
#3 10 1.5239 * 106 6.562 * 10-6 
Average Value: 7.101 * 10-6 
e) It can be seen that the values of the theoretical calculation and the test simulation 
are in agreement within an 11% difference4 – and the difference is expected to 
decrease with greater statistical accuracy achieved through more replications. 
Though not all outputs of the simulation can be verified through analytical 
methods, partial verification of such measures lends confidence and weight to the 
overall accuracy of the model. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 The actual percentage difference of 10.95% between the theoretical and simulation results for the test case 
appeared to be magnified due to small fractions resulting from the large numbers of sorties generated 
(denominator) with an extremely low failure occurrence rate (10-6). However, this provided an extreme case 
for our simulation boundaries. If we increase the failure occurrence rate to 10-3 (which will be more typical 
of existing UAS designs), the percentage difference between the simulation and analytical results is 
reduced to 2.51%. 
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4.3.3.2 Validation – Did I Build the Correct Model? 
Upon verification of the model, the next step of validation posed certain challenges 
because no real-world or historical data was available to validate the output results of the 
model. Hence, external perspectives were an important source of validation. Consultation 
with my thesis advisor and other students involved in ISHM research provided valuable 
insights on process logic and modeling techniques. The final validation shall be provided 
by the research sponsors from AFRL who will be able to provide Subject Matter Expert 
(SME) advice on the applicability of this research model. 
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
This section discusses the test scenarios to achieve various ISHM implementation 
objectives. Although a large number of input variables and possible values exist, the 
design of the various experiments fixed certain parameters at reasonable baseline values 
as defined in Table 9. Thereafter, variables of interest (factors) were varied at defined 
levels and provided as inputs to the simulation models. Using Arena ® Process Analyzer, 
results (responses) from the simulation models were obtained and the various scenarios 
were ranked in terms of achievement of desired objectives. In order to improve the 
statistical accuracy for the simulation results, each test scenario was run for 10 
replications for every experiment. In addition, a Common Random Number (CRN) 
strategy was employed to reduce random variance (“noise”) between the ISHM-Enabled 
UAS and Non-UAS models, i.e. assigning the same random number streams to failure 
occurrence and detection decisions within the two simulation models [Banks et al., 
2010].  
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The first experiment demonstrates the dependence of UAS expected lifetime on failure 
occurrence rate. With the boundaries provided by the first experiment, in terms of failure 
occurrence rates, the second experiment investigates those relevant scenarios with the 
greatest percentage extension of UAS life expectancy. The third and fourth experiments 
seek to establish a business case for ISHM implementation through reduction of Cannot-
Duplicate (CND) cases and maintenance activities. 
 
4.4.1 Dependence of UAS Expected Lifetime on Failure Occurrence Rate, λ 
This experiment seeks to identify those parameters that have an influence on UAS 
expected lifetime. Table 12 lists the various factors and levels considered for this 
experiment. Based on the three factors and their associated levels, a total of 80 scenarios 
are being tested for the desired response. Appendix B: Table B1 shows the results of this 
experiment in terms of the relative ranking of the 80 scenarios in achieving the longest 
UAS expected lifetime of an ISHM-enabled UAS. 
 
Table 12 – Experiment 1: Design Factors and Levels 
 
Input/Control Variables 
Factors 
Defined Values 
Levels 
Failure Rate, λ 10
-1, 10-2, 10-3,  10-4, 10-5 
Unit: failure per hour. 
P(Sensor Detection) 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 
P(ISHM Confidence) 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 
Output Performance Measure 
(Response) 
UAS Expected Lifetime 
Unit: Hours 
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Results: The experiment showed that the failure occurrence rate has the greatest effect on 
the UAS expected lifetime. Figure 23 illustrates the range of UAS lifetimes associated 
with the various levels of failure occurrence rates defined for the experiment. For an 
extremely low failure occurrence rate of 10-5, it is possible to achieve over a million flight 
hours for an UAS with or without ISHM implementation. However, UAS are not 
typically designed for such extended lifetimes, as age-related issues such as structural 
health will outweigh the benefits provided by ISHM. On the other hand, a high failure 
occurrence rate of 10-1 will reduce the expected lifetime to a few hundred flying hours – 
and such a low-reliability UAS will not be cost-effective for ISHM consideration.  
Hence, this experiment tightened the bounds for failure occurrence rates in subsequent 
experiments. Thus, only failure rates between 10-4 and 10-2 per flying hour will be 
considered in the remaining experiments. 
 
Figure 23  – Experiment 1: Dependence of UAS Expected Lifetime on Failure Occurrence Rate 
Failure Occurrence 
Rate
[Per Flying Hour]
UAS Lifetime
(ISHM-Enabled UAS)
[Hours]
3,662,213.50
λ = 0.00001
1,541,751.50
354,312.50
λ = 0.0001
139,169.00
38,676.00
λ = 0.001
16,477.50
3,878.50
λ = 0.01
1,689.00
432.50
λ = 0.1
185.00
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4.4.2 Maximizing Percentage of Lifetime Extension 
This experiment seeks to identify those scenarios that will yield the greatest benefit in 
terms of operational lifetime extension through ISHM implementation. With the revised 
bounds for failure occurrence rates, the input factors/levels are shown in to Table 13, with 
48 scenarios being tested for the desired response. Appendix B: Table B-2 shows the 
results of this experiment in terms of the relative ranking of the 48 scenarios in achieving 
the greatest percentage of lifetime extension through ISHM implementation. 
 
Table 13 – Experiment 2: Design Factors and Levels 
 
Input/Control Variables 
Factors 
Defined Values 
Levels 
Failure Rate, λ 10
-2, 10-3,  10-4 
Unit: failure per hour. 
P(Sensor Detection) 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 
P(ISHM Confidence) 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 
Output Performance Measure 
(Response) 
Percentage Gain in Lifetime Extension (%) 
 
Results: From the simulation results, it was observed that, for a non-ISHM UAS, the 
expected lifetime is highly sensitive to its baseline sensor probability of detection. 
However, for an ISHM-enabled UAS, in scenarios where the probability of ISHM 
confidence is higher than the baseline sensor probability of detection, the expected 
lifetime is relatively insensitive to the latter, but highly sensitive to the former. The 
reason for the latter is because in the ISHM-enabled UAS model, the eventual declaration 
by ISHM of a failure will override the detection result of the baseline sensor. 
 
 
76 
 
Therefore, to achieve the most benefit through ISHM implementation, in terms of 
lifetime extension, the probability of ISHM confidence must be much higher than the 
probability of baseline sensor detection. 
 
For scenarios with the same probabilities of baseline sensor detection and ISHM 
confidence, the deciding factor appeared to be on the former. Refer to Table 14. With the 
baseline sensor having a probability of detection above 0.8, the experiment showed that 
implementing ISHM does not improve the UAS expected lifetime. 
 
Table 14 – Experiment 2: Scenarios with Same Probabilities of Baseline Sensor Detection  
and ISHM Confidence 
 
 
 
4.4.3 Minimizing Number of Cannot-Duplicate (CND) Cases 
This experiment seeks to identify those scenarios that will reduce troubleshooting times 
for maintainers in dealing with Cannot-Duplicate (CND) defect reports. The benefits of 
reduced CND cases can be further quantified in terms of reduced maintenance time 
leading to better availability of the UAS. In addition, conservative maintenance policies 
Ra
nk
in
g Failure Occurrence 
Rate
[Per Flying Hour]
Probability of 
Detection 
(Baseline Sensor)
Probability of ISHM 
Confidence
UAS Lifetime
(ISHM-Enabled UAS)
[Hours]
(a)
UAS Lifetime
(Non-ISHM UAS)
[Hours]
(b)
Increase in UAS 
Lifetime
(c) = (a)-(b)
% Lifetime Gain
(d) = (c)/(b)
1 0.001 0.6 0.6 16477.5 10755.5 5722 53.20%
2 0.01 0.6 0.6 1689 1105 584 52.85%
3 0.0001 0.6 0.6 139169 103479.5 35689.5 34.49%
4 0.001 0.7 0.7 18828 15623 3205 20.51%
5 0.01 0.7 0.7 1914.5 1687.5 227 13.45%
6 0.0001 0.7 0.7 158851.5 154323.5 4528 2.93%
7 0.001 0.8 0.8 22096.5 24979.5 -2883 -11.54%
8 0.01 0.8 0.8 2266 2634.5 -368.5 -13.99%
9 0.0001 0.8 0.8 191844.5 253859 -62014.5 -24.43%
10 0.001 0.9 0.9 38676 74975.5 -36299.5 -48.42%
11 0.01 0.9 0.9 3878.5 7679.5 -3801 -49.50%
12 0.0001 0.9 0.9 354312.5 731245.5 -376933 -51.55%
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that dictate the replacement of component for precautionary measures in the event of 
CND will increase maintenance costs significantly. In the absence of a failure condition, 
the design specifications of baseline sensors and ISHM (in terms of probabilities of false 
alarm) will determine the number of CND cases. Table 15 lists the various factors and 
levels considered for this experiment and a total of 75 scenarios are being tested for the 
desired response. Appendix B: Table B3 shows the results of this experiment in terms of 
the relative ranking of the 75 scenarios in achieving the maximum reduction in terms of 
CND cases. 
 
Table 15 – Experiment 3: Design Factors and Levels 
 
Input/Control Variables 
Factors 
Defined Values 
Levels 
Failure Rate, λ  10
-2, 10-3,  10-4 
Unit: failure per hour. 
P(Sensor False Alarm) 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05 
P(ISHM False Alarm) 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05 
Output Performance Measure 
(Response) 
Reduction in CND Cases 
 
Results: From the simulation results, it was observed that for a non-ISHM UAS, the 
number of CND cases is highly sensitive to its baseline sensor probability of false alarm. 
However, for an ISHM-enabled UAS, in scenarios where the probability of ISHM false 
alarm is lower than the baseline sensor probability of false alarm, the number of CND 
cases is relatively insensitive to the latter, but highly sensitive to the former. The reason 
for the latter is because in the ISHM-enabled UAS model, the eventual declaration by 
ISHM of a non-failure will override the detection result of the baseline sensor. This result 
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can be illustrated by Figure 24. Considering the specific case when the failure rate is 
0.001 per flying hour, the surface plot showed that there is positive reduction in CND 
cases only when the probability of the baseline sensor false alarm is higher than or equals 
to the probability of ISHM false alarm (as represented by the upper light blue area). 
 
 
Figure 24  – Experiment 3: Minimizing Number of CND Cases 
 
From the analytic model, higher CND counts (over an UAS’ lifetime) are expected for 
more reliable UAS. To achieve a greater reduction in the number of CND cases, the 
probability of ISHM false alarm must be much lower than the probability of false alarm 
for the baseline sensor. 
 
Refer to Table 16. For scenarios where the probabilities of false alarm are the same for 
the baseline sensor and ISHM, the simulation results suggested that ISHM 
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implementation is only effective in reducing CND cases when the failure occurrence rate 
is less than 10-3. 
 
Table 16 – Experiment 3: Scenarios with Same Probabilities of Baseline Sensor False Alarm and 
ISHM False Alarm 
 
 
 
4.4.4 Minimizing Number of Maintenance Actions 
This experiment seeks to identify those scenarios that will reduce the overall maintenance 
actions. It is assumed in the analytic model that an ISHM-enabled UAS will not require 
scheduled maintenance due to its added onboard diagnostics and prognostics capabilities. 
However, additional maintenance for an ISHM-enabled UAS will be driven by generated 
ISHM false alarms. The benefits of reduced maintenance actions can be further 
quantified by assigning a cost factor to each of the maintenance actions. This will provide 
justifications in relaxing maintenance schedule intervals and eventually a condition-based 
maintenance program through ISHM. Table 17 lists the various factors and levels 
considered for this experiment. Similar to the previous experiment, a total of 75 scenarios 
Ra
nk
in
g Failure Occurrence 
Rate
[Per Flying Hour]
Probability of False 
Alarm
(Baseline Sensor)
Probability of
ISHM False Alarm
Total Cases of CND
(ISHM-Enabled UAS)
[a]
Total Cases of CND
(Non-ISHM UAS)
[b]
Reduction in CND
[c]=[b]-[a]
% Reduction in 
CND
[d]=[c]/[b]
1 0.0001 0.05 0.05 977 1286 309 24.03%
2 0.0001 0.04 0.04 778 1023 245 23.95%
3 0.0001 0.03 0.03 584 768 184 23.96%
4 0.0001 0.02 0.02 390 515 125 24.27%
5 0.0001 0.01 0.01 193 252 59 23.41%
6 0.001 0.05 0.05 111 128 17 13.28%
7 0.001 0.04 0.04 89 103 14 13.59%
8 0.001 0.03 0.03 66 76 10 13.16%
9 0.001 0.02 0.02 45 51 6 11.76%
10 0.001 0.01 0.01 22 25 3 12.00%
11 0.01 0.05 0.05 11 13 2 15.38%
12 0.01 0.03 0.03 7 8 1 12.50%
13 0.01 0.04 0.04 9 10 1 10.00%
14 0.01 0.01 0.01 2 2 0 0.00%
15 0.01 0.02 0.02 5 5 0 0.00%
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are being tested for the desired response. Appendix B: Table B4 shows the results of this 
experiment in terms of the relative ranking of the 75 scenarios in achieving the maximum 
reduction in terms of maintenance actions. 
 
For ISHM-Enabled UAS, total maintenance actions include: 
• Total Number of CND Cases (troubleshooting required) 
• Total Number of Unscheduled ISHM Maintenance (due to ISHM missed 
detections and false alarms) 
• Total Number of Unscheduled Sensor Maintenance (due to baseline sensor 
missed detections and false alarms) 
 
For Non-ISHM UAS, total maintenance actions include: 
• Total Number of CND Cases (troubleshooting required) 
• Total Number of Scheduled Maintenance (with maintenance interval of 
1000 flying hours) 
• Total Number of Unscheduled Sensor Maintenance (due to baseline sensor 
false alarms only) 
 
Table 17 – Experiment 4: Design Factors and Levels 
 
Input/Control Variables 
Factors 
Defined Values 
Levels 
Failure Rate, λ 10
-2, 10-3,  10-4 
Unit: failure per hour. 
P(Sensor False Alarm) 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05 
P(ISHM False Alarm) 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05 
Output Performance Measure 
(Response) 
Reduction in Maintenance Actions 
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Results: Of the 75 tested scenarios, a total of 46 scenarios showed a reduction in overall 
maintenance activities with ISHM implementation. As an illustration, refer to Figure 25 
for the specific case when the failure occurrence rate is 0.01 per flying hour. If we 
consider the effects of probabilities of false alarm on the number of maintenance actions, 
it was observed from this surface plot that there is positive reduction in maintenance 
actions only when the probability of the baseline sensor false alarm is higher than the 
probability of ISHM false alarm (as represented by the upper light blue area). 
 
 
Figure 25  – Experiment 4: Minimizing Number of Maintenance Actions 
 
From a system engineer’s perspective, a cost-benefit analysis can be derived from the 
results of this experiment. Each response value in terms of reduction in maintenance 
actions can be assigned a cost value. The expected cost savings can then be weighed 
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against the design budget or the expected cost of the ISHM system (with specified 
performance requirements) to evaluate its cost-effectiveness. 
4.5 Analysis Summary 
This chapter provided details of the Arena ® simulation and highlighted the assumptions 
in input modeling due to data inadequacies. Thereafter, four experiments were set-up to 
test full-factorial scenarios in achieving desired ISHM performance measures. The 
desired outcome of the validated scenarios is to provide future UAS designers with an 
analytical tool to identify performance specifications of baseline UAS and 
complementing ISHM systems to achieve a desired UAS lifetime extension or reduction 
in maintenance costs. 
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter will discuss the answers to the research objectives and recommend areas for 
future research. 
5.2 Research Questions Answered 
The focus of this research was to quantify the continued airworthiness benefits of ISHM 
by developing an analytic architecture for comparison between an “as-is” UAS (without 
ISHM capabilities) and a “to-be” UAS (with ISHM capabilities). From an airworthiness 
certification perspective, this research sought to develop a method for establishing 
performance requirements for components of an ISHM-enabled UAS.  
 
Prior to developing the architecture, a literature review was conducted to gain a better 
understanding of the research arena. The following questions were posed in Chapter I for 
literature review: 
 
(1) What is system health monitoring/management and what are some related 
applications? 
There are many different terms and associated definitions on system health management 
available in the literature and this research chose the term, Integrated System Health 
Management (ISHM) – aligned to previous research in the department [Storm, 2013]. 
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Benedettini et al. [2009] termed system health management as integrated vehicle health 
management (IVHM) and defined it as “a collection of data relevant to the present and 
future performance of a vehicle system and its transformation into information can be 
used to support operational decisions”. The authors also presented various definitions 
found in the literature that sought to provide a top-level perspective of ISHM. 
 
In terms of related ISHM applications, Health and Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMS) 
surfaced as one of the more matured applications related to airworthiness of helicopters. 
These systems emerged in the 1980s as a response to the high accident rates experienced 
by offshore shuttle helicopters traversing the petrol installations in the North Sea, and 
increased demand for improved operational safety and reduced rotorcraft maintenance 
costs had paved the way for HUMS [Wiig, 2006]. In terms of process management, the 
typical processes of a HUMS program are previously depicted in Figure 2 [JHSIT, 2013]. 
Basic HUMS operations include real-time data collection and download, defining 
thresholds based on trending information, and comparison of health indicators against 
these thresholds to ensure continued airworthiness of the aircraft. This concept of 
operations is definitely in agreement with that of a typical ISHM implementation. HUMS 
originated from an airworthiness concern, and its implementation drove extensive 
research in condition-based rotorcraft maintenance. Understanding the HUMS 
architecture and associated processes provided alignment in this research in developing 
the analytic architecture and associated maintenance cost models. 
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Apart from aerospace applications, the literature review also cited a technological 
breakthrough from the health care industry – to draw parallel inferences of ISHM from 
another systems thinking perspective. Artificial intelligence in the form of IBM’s Watson 
provides consistency of decisions amongst available medical solutions, based on accurate 
clinical examinations and evidence [Cohn, 2013]. Such technological breakthroughs in 
health care, in the areas of sensor data fusion and artificial intelligence, presented 
similarities to an ideal ISHM architecture that integrates processed sensor information 
and intelligence through diagnostics and prognostics algorithms. 
 
(2) What are the essential elements of ISHM? 
The ISHM design and operation concept embraces an integration of sensors, 
communication technologies, and artificial intelligence to provide vehicle-wide abilities 
to diagnose problems and recommend solutions [Benedettini et al., 2009]. At the front 
end of a typical ISHM architecture is a sensor suite responsible for gathering state 
awareness variables that are indicative of potential failure modes. For an envisaged 
ISHM configuration, apart from conventional sensors that monitor and control sub-
systems, system-level sensor suites are also being introduced in the form of smart 
embedded sensor systems with wireless communications transfer protocol in place for 
overall system health management. Upon filtering of sensor data to extract relevant fault 
features, the diagnostics module analyzes the fault features to detect, identify and isolate 
impending fault conditions. In addition, with health and usage data being fed to the 
prognostic module, the latter is able to combine historical data to generate an estimation 
of the time-to-failure of specific subsystems and components. Depending on the level of 
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autonomy, such diagnostic and prognostic information can be processed on-board the 
vehicle through its auto-recovery systems or communicated to technical support 
managers on ground. In order to highlight the similarities in considerations between the 
analytic architecture developed in this research and the typical ISHM architecture 
described in the literature review, the relevant operational activities from the OV-5a were 
superimposed on Figure 3 that previously depicted the suggested architecture for ISHM. 
 
Figure 3 – Typical ISHM Architecture [Benedettini et al., 2009]  
(* Superimposed with operational activities of developed analytic architecture) 
 
(3) What are the critical FMECA hazards associated with a typical UAS and their 
relation to airworthiness? 
NASA published a report in 2007 that identified the typical failure conditions of a UAS 
based on functional decomposition of a generic UAS [Hayhurst et al., 2007]. The full 
functional decomposition is relatively large, with 69 functions at the lowest level under 
the major functions of aviate, navigate, communicate and mitigate. The primary safety 
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goal of the failure hazard assessment is to avoid any UAS-initiated decrease in the safety 
of the National Air Space (NAS). As a result, failure condition criticality is determined 
by its effect on people on ground or in other aircraft. Damage to material assets is out-of-
scope, unless it affects human safety. The majority of potential failure conditions fall 
under the Aviate or Mitigate functions. In the assessment by NASA, twenty-six 
potentially catastrophic failure conditions out of 132 were identified, considering only 
single failures in the en-route phase of flight.  
 
Although severity effects related to the occupants of an aircraft do not apply to unmanned 
systems, other severe outcomes are possible that will result in human casualties, either in 
other aircraft or on the ground. Ground impact can endanger the general public, and midair 
collision with a manned aircraft can threaten the safety of the passengers aboard that aircraft. 
Both effects are critical system design drivers that have implications for UAS operations and 
reliability requirement. As the size of an UAS grow from Micro → Mini → Tactical → 
MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) → HALE (High Altitude Long Endurance) → 
Heavy classifications in terms of weight, there will be an increased level of hazard risk 
involved in the operation of UAS [Weibel and Hansman, 2005]. 
 
Airworthiness requirements and certification for UAS are hence crucial in assessing its 
inherent operating risk. System safety is the application of engineering and management 
principles (such as FMECA), criteria and techniques to optimize all aspects of safety 
within the constraints of operational effectiveness, time and cost throughout all phases of 
the system life cycle. A system safety program is crucial for the initial and continued 
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airworthiness of all weapon systems, both manned and unmanned. Understanding the 
functional decomposition of a generic UAS and the potential failure conditions and 
effects provided an appreciation of the top-level functional failure modes in architecting 
ISHM for initial and continued airworthiness. 
 
(4) What is Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM)? 
Though the benefits of ISHM are well recognized, the most quantifiable benefits in the 
current paradigm were almost exclusively reported in terms of maintenance related 
savings. Specifically, HUMS and CBM are almost synonymous in the rotorcraft world. 
CBM, also known as unscheduled/corrective maintenance, defines a maintenance policy 
where components are replaced upon detection of an unsatisfactory condition – such as 
those detected (or even predicted) by an ISHM system. Every component has a safe life 
or operating life, beyond which continued operation of the component could result in 
catastrophic failures. In a scheduled maintenance policy, there is potential for wastage 
should a component be replaced way ahead of its life expiration. With the potential of 
increased health management and surveillance presented by ISHM, the useful life of a 
component can be extended until diagnostic or prognostic algorithms decide that an 
impending failure is imminent. To implement a safe and effective CBM program, it 
should be cautioned that the algorithms will have to consider the uncertainty and 
confidence levels regarding a component’s useful life in order not to encroach upon the 
unsafe operating window. A CBM life cycle model was incorporated within the analytic 
architecture for a cost-benefit analysis of an ISHM-enabled UAS as compared to a non-
ISHM UAS requiring scheduled (or time-based) maintenance.  
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The answers to the literature review provided the foundation in the development of the 
analytic architecture and the discrete-event simulation model. Thereafter, the results from 
the simulation model serve to answer the following research questions: 
 
(1) What are the performance characteristics of ISHM to ensure continued 
airworthiness of the UAS?  
The Arena ® discrete-simulation model made provision for investigation of various UAS 
parameters for ISHM implementation based on the analytic architecture. The simulation 
model defines the airworthiness of an ISHM-enabled UAS through the output parameter 
of UAS Expected Lifetime. Within the limits of defined boundary conditions, it was 
observed that the failure occurrence rate has the greatest effect on the UAS expected 
lifetime. For an extremely low failure occurrence rate of 10-5, it is possible to achieve 
over a million flight hours for an UAS with or without ISHM implementation. This result 
made possible the tightening of experimental boundaries to only consider scenarios with 
typical UAS lifetimes within reasonable failure occurrence rates.  
 
The secondary observation from the simulation model is that for a non-ISHM UAS, the 
expected lifetime is highly sensitive to its baseline sensor probability of detection. 
However, for an ISHM-enabled UAS, in scenarios where the probability of ISHM 
confidence is higher than the baseline sensor probability of detection, the expected 
lifetime is relatively insensitive to the latter, but highly sensitive to the former. This is 
explained by the fact that for an ISHM-enabled UAS, the eventual declaration of a failure 
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(or non-failure) from its diagnostics and prognostics algorithms will override the 
detection results by the baseline sensor. 
 
Establishing Performance Requirements for an ISHM-Enabled UAS 
Initial Airworthiness – In the preliminary or conceptual design stage of an UAS, the 
designer should be aware of the design requirements, i.e. in terms of the desired UAS 
expected operational lifetime (output performance). From the results of the simulation, an 
associated reliability requirement of the UAS in terms of failure rate can be obtained as a 
performance specification. This overall reliability requirement can then be cascaded 
through the subsystems of the UAS based on reliability allocation design. Secondly, 
performance specifications in terms of baseline sensor qualities and ISHM 
diagnostics/prognostics capabilities can be specified by the parameters of Probability of 
Sensor Detection and Probability of ISHM Confidence respectively. 
 
Continued Airworthiness – For a non-ISHM UAS in the operational phase of its life cycle 
considering an ISHM upgrade, existing performance data on failure occurrence rates and 
baseline sensor detection rates would have been available. Comparing the available field 
information with the simulation results will assist the designer in defining performance 
specifications in terms of ISHM diagnostics/prognostics capabilities to achieve a desired 
reduction in maintenance costs.  
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(2) How will ISHM provide a business case to improve the level of UAS self-
autonomy? 
This research effort developed two separate Arena ® simulation models for an ISHM-
enabled UAS and non-ISHM UAS. Among the 48 scenarios tested, only 26 scenarios 
showed an expected gain in UAS life expectancy with ISHM implementation. Hence, 
ISHM does not necessarily improve the life expectancy of a UAS, especially in 
conditions where the baseline sensors have shown excellent performance in detection of 
failure conditions. Therefore, implementing an ISHM system with poor diagnostics 
and/or prognostics capabilities will only do more harm than good. We conclude that in 
order to achieve lifetime extension with ISHM implementation, the probability of ISHM 
confidence must be greater than the probability of detection for the baseline sensor. 
 
The simulation models were set-up to investigate the cost-effectiveness of a CBM policy 
for an ISHM-enabled UAS that was assumed not to require scheduled maintenance unlike 
the non-ISHM UAS. Among the 75 scenarios tested for reduction in maintenance actions, 
only 46 scenarios showed a reduction in the total number of maintenance actions after 
ISHM implementation. This result cautioned that it will be important to define ISHM 
performance specifications in terms of missed detection and false alarm rates so that 
implementing ISHM onboard a UAS will not induce unnecessary maintenance actions. In 
addition, different costs components attributed to the various types of maintenance 
actions will need to be considered to weigh against the implementation cost of ISHM.  In 
summary, the simulation results from the test scenarios will be able to determine the 
performance specifications of the envisaged ISHM system, by considering the desired 
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benefits of ISHM implementation based on the existing reliability of the UAS and the 
baseline sensor quality. 
 
(3) What are the potential impacts of ISHM to maintenance practices and life cycle 
costs? 
One of the performance measures recorded from the simulation models was the number 
of Cannot-Duplicate (CND) cases, where a failure was reported in flight but the condition 
was unable to be duplicated on ground. Not only does CND drive additional maintenance 
effort in terms of extended troubleshooting along all possible paths of a fault tree 
analysis, it also reduces confidence in the UAS being able to perform subsequent 
missions – and in many instances, confidence drives changes in maintenance policies. A 
good ISHM system should reduce both the number of missed detections and false alarms 
of a UAS, and minimizing the latter will mean less CND cases. It is expected that with 
increased sophistication of future UAS, its cost will also increase substantially. This may 
dictate conservative approaches in maintenance of such high-value assets. In releasing 
UAS for flight with a CND, replacement of components for precautionary measure could 
be mandatory – inducing higher costs for UAS maintenance. A desired ISHM system 
should hence act as a safeguard for missed detections, while being a filter for false 
alarms. With added confidence in onboard autonomy through ISHM, it will then be 
possible to relax scheduled maintenance requirements and, in the long-term, adopt a 
condition-based maintenance (CBM) program with potential life cycle cost savings. It 
should be cautioned, though, that CBM drives undesired changes to maintenance policies 
in terms of maintenance scheduling. CBM will be more difficult to forecast and plan for 
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as compared to time-based maintenance, and may result in inefficiencies with regard to 
resource allocation. 
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
This research effort provides potential designers with a top-level reference in determining 
performance specifications for an ISHM-enabled UAS to achieve desired airworthiness 
and maintenance outcomes, and there exists potential areas of future research. The 
Arena® simulation models were based upon the analytic architecture and it would be 
advisable to review the architecture for relevance of applications in future research. An 
important emphasis of this research lie in the accurate documentation of model input 
parameters, assumptions, implementation and results. Documentation is important to 
caveat the research conclusions within tested boundary conditions, and provide easy 
reference for potential researchers interested in this work.  
 
Although the model provides provision for variation in many parameters (such as latency 
threshold, defined scheduled maintenance interval, etc.), not all of them were assigned as 
input/design variables in the analysis. One area of future research can be in terms of an 
extensive Design of Experiment (DOE) effort, to investigate the interactions among the 
various variables considered together to achieve a desired response. Thereafter, statistical 
regression techniques can be used to derive a model equation considering the input 
variables with significant effects. 
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All of this research effort used theoretical values when evaluating the simulation model. 
The levels considered for the test scenarios were arbitrary and may not be representative 
of real-world systems. Instead of the constant failure rate model that is currently 
assumed, realistic failure sub-models exhibiting wear-out conditions can be developed if 
failure data for existing UAS are made available. Similarly, sensor degradation can be 
incorporated in future research to model increased sensor maintenance in accordance to 
actual degradation patterns of a fielded sensor. In addition, when information on ISHM 
system prototypes are available, actual performance data can then be input into the 
simulation model to yield more realistic results. 
 
An important assumption of the existing architecture and discrete-event simulation model 
is that in an ISHM-enabled UAS, the detection outcome by the baseline sensor and the 
eventual declaration by ISHM were assumed to be independent events, with the latter 
being the final authority in failure declaration. This effectively rendered the baseline 
sensor as a ‘non-factor’ in the ISHM-enabled UAS simulation model in determining the 
expected lifetime of the UAS. This research does not investigate dependency of detection 
events, or different diagnostics or prognostics algorithms in resolving conflicts of 
baseline sensor and ISHM decisions, and future research could expound on developing 
ISHM algorithms to investigate dependency between them in order to define ISHM 
performance characteristics. 
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5.4 Summary 
This research effort developed an analytic architecture and an associated discrete-event 
simulation to investigate the potential benefits of ISHM implementation onboard an 
UAS. From the results of the simulation, it was shown that ISHM presented the most 
cost-effective improvement over baseline systems in situations where the reliability of the 
UAS is poor (relative to manned systems) and the baseline sensor exhibited poor qualities 
in terms of missed detection and false alarm rates. Through simulation experiments 
involving defined test scenarios, it was observed that failure occurrence rates, sensor 
quality characteristics and ISHM performance specifications were significant factors in 
determining the output responses of the model. Although ISHM presented benefits in its 
envisioned implementation, the test scenarios exhibited instances whereby poor 
performance specifications of ISHM systems would lead to a reduced life expectancy, or 
increased maintenance actions, especially in the case of a highly reliable UAS. 
 
It is important to note that the results of this research seek to provide potential designers 
with top-level performance specifications of an ISHM implementation. However, the 
results of the analysis are only bounded by the defined assumptions of the simulation 
model. The analytic architecture is only a piece of the ISHM puzzle, and should be 
considered with other analyses to achieve the desired outcome of Integrated System 
Health Management for autonomous UAS.   
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Appendix A: Description of Arena ® Modules and Sub-Models 
Initialization Modules 
Title: Average Sortie Duration 
Applicable To: Both ISHM-Enabled UAS and Non-ISHM UAS Models 
Type: Assign Module 
Diagram: 
 
Purpose: Assigns average sortie duration as a parameter to the simulation model. 
Parameter: NormalASD = 10 (hours) 
Assumption/ 
Additional 
Information: 
Assumed that an UAS mission that recovers Code 1 or Code 2 will fly an average 
mission length of 10 hours. 
 
Title: Sortie Generator 
Applicable To: Both ISHM-Enabled UAS and Non-ISHM UAS Models 
Type: Create Module 
Diagram: 
 
Purpose: Creates arrival entities (generate sorties) to simulation model at a specified rate. 
Parameter: Constant inter-arrival time of 12 hours, i.e. one sortie generated every 12 hours. 
Assumption/ 
Additional 
Information: 
Assumed that only 2 sorties planned in a 24-hour cycle for each UAS. 
 
Title: Define Scheduled Maintenance Interval 
Applicable To: Non-ISHM UAS Model Only 
Type: Assign Module 
Diagram: 
 
Purpose: Assigns the scheduled maintenance requirement to the Non-ISHM UAS model. 
Parameter: DefinedMaintenanceInterval = 1000 (hours) 
Assumption: Assumed to be a fixed interval throughout the life of the UAS. 
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Title: Sortie Probability of Failure 
Applicable To: Both ISHM-Enabled UAS and Non-ISHM UAS Models 
Type: Assign Module 
Diagram: 
 
Purpose: Calculates probability of failure for particular sortie based on occurrence rate. 
Parameter: 
FailureOccurrenceRate:  
Typical Values considered: 10-1, 10-2, 10-3(baseline), 10-4, and 10-5  
Unit: failure per hour. 
* Based on suggested probability levels defined in Table 2 [DoD, 2000].  
ProbFailure = 1 – e-FailureOccurrenceRate * NormalASD  
Variable based on occurrence rate. 
RandomFailureFlag: UNIF(0,1,1) 
Assigns the first common random number stream to this variable as a means of variance 
reduction between the ISHM-enabled UAS model and the Non-ISHM UAS model. 
Assumption/ 
Additional 
Information: 
Failure rate assumed to be relatively constant during normal UAS operation if system 
design is mature [Blanchard, 2004]. The failure rate is usually what is presented in 
FMECA reports, e.g. 1 failure in 106 hours (or λ = 10-6 failure per hour). Probability of 
failure is assumed to follow an exponential function with constant failure rate. 
 
Title: Failure Occurred? 
Applicable To: Both ISHM-Enabled UAS and Non-ISHM UAS Models 
Type: Decide Module 
Diagram: 
 
Purpose: Determines if a failure condition exists for each sortie. 
Parameter: True if RandomFailureFlag <= ProbFailure 
Logic: Based on presence (or absence) of failure condition within particular sortie, decides on the two major logic flows within each simulation model. 
Assumption/ 
Additional 
Information: 
For each of the two simulation models, there exist two similar major logic flows that 
include the a) failure condition present, and b) failure condition absent flows. 
 
  
 
98 
 
Failure Assessment and Detection Sub-Models 
Title: A1.3 Perform Failure Assessment 
Applicable To: Both ISHM-Enabled UAS and Non-ISHM UAS Models 
Type: Sub-Model 
Diagram: 
 
Purpose: Determines if a present failure condition is catastrophic or has a significant accumulated latent effect from prior missed detections. 
Parameter: 
Number of Sorties With Failures: Record Module 
ProbCatastrophicFailure = 26/132 = 0.197 
LatencyFactor (range from 0 to 5) – attribute of current sortie 
AccumulatedLatencyEffect – system variable of UAS 
RandomCatastrophicFlag: UNIF(0,1,2) 
Assigns the second common random number stream to this variable as a means of 
variance reduction between the ISHM-enabled UAS model and the Non-ISHM UAS 
model. 
Logic: 
Based on probability of a failure being catastrophic, assigns a status flag to a sortie. Also 
checks the accumulated latency effect from missed detections of past sorties against the 
LatencyThreshold (fixed at 5) to ascertain latency factor of current sortie. 
Assumption/ 
Additional 
Information: 
Based on NASA report in Feb 2007, there are 26 potentially catastrophic failures out of 
132 identified failure conditions for a generic UAS [Hayhurst et al., 2007]. 
Assumed that a maximum of 5 prior missed detections will result in the upgrade in 
severity of a current defect that will result in a mishap if undetected. 
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Title: A1.2 Perform Failure Detection 
Applicable To: Both ISHM-Enabled UAS and Non-ISHM UAS Models 
Type: Sub-Model 
Diagram: 
 
Purpose: Determines if a present failure condition is detected by baseline sensor. 
Parameter: 
ProbSensorDetection: 
Typical Values considered: 0.6, 0.7, 0.8 (baseline),  and 0.9 
RandomSensorDetectionFlag: UNIF(0,1,3) 
Assigns the third common random number stream to this variable as a means of 
variance reduction between the ISHM-enabled UAS model and the Non-ISHM UAS 
model. 
IF RandomSensorDetectionFlag <= ProbSensorDetection,  
SensorDetected (status flag) = 1, ELSE SensorDetected (status flag) = 0. 
Logic: Based on probability of sensor detection, assigns a status flag to a sortie.  
Assumption/ 
Additional 
Information: 
Assumed to be a baseline sensor characteristic for generic UAS. Has a positive 
correlation with expected UAS lifetime. 
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Title: A1.2 Perform Failure Detection (False Alarm) 
Applicable To: Both ISHM-Enabled UAS and Non-ISHM UAS Models 
Type: Sub-Model 
Diagram: 
 
Purpose: Determines if baseline sensor produces a false alarm when no failure condition exists. 
Parameter: 
Number of Sorties Without Failure: Record Module 
ProbSensorFalseAlarm: 
Typical Values considered: 0.01, 0.02, 0.03 (baseline), 0.04  and 0.05 
RandomSensorFAFlag: UNIF(0,1,4) 
Assigns the fourth common random number stream to this variable as a means of 
variance reduction between the ISHM-enabled UAS model and the Non-ISHM UAS 
model. 
IF RandomSensorFAFlag <= ProbSensorFalseAlarm,  
SensorFalseAlarm (status flag) = 1, ELSE SensorFalseAlarm (status flag) = 0. 
Logic: Based on probability of sensor false alarm, assigns a status flag to a sortie.  
Assumption/ 
Additional 
Information: 
Assumed to be a baseline sensor characteristic for generic UAS. Has a positive 
correlation with unscheduled sensor maintenance actions. 
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Title: A2.1 Perform Diagnostics and Prognostics Assessment 
Applicable To: ISHM-Enabled UAS Model Only 
Type: Sub-Model 
Diagram: 
 
Purpose: Determines if a present failure condition is ascertained by ISHM. 
Parameter: 
ProbISHMConfidence: 
Typical Values considered: 0.6, 0.7, 0.8 (baseline),  and 0.9 
RandomISHMDetectionFlag: UNIF(0,1,5) 
Assigns the fifth common random number stream to this variable as a means of variance 
reduction between the ISHM-enabled UAS model and the Non-ISHM UAS model. 
IF RandomISHMDetectionFlag <= ProbISHMConfidence,  
ISHMConfirmed (status flag) = 1, ELSE ISHMConfirmed (status flag) = 0. 
Logic: Based on probability of ISHM confidence (representing strength of ISHM diagnostics and prognostics algorithms), assigns a status flag to a sortie.  
Assumption/ 
Additional 
Information: 
Desired performance specification of ISHM system. Has a positive correlation with the 
expected UAS lifetime. 
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Title: A2.1 Perform Diagnostics and Prognostics Assessment (False Alarm) 
Applicable To: ISHM-Enabled UAS Model Only 
Type: Sub-Model 
Diagram: 
 
Purpose: Determines if ISHM produces a false alarm when no failure condition exists. 
Parameter: 
ProbISHMFalseAlarm 
Typical Values considered: 0.01, 0.02, 0.03 (baseline), 0.04  and 0.05 
RandomISHMFAFlag: UNIF(0,1,6) 
Assigns the sixth common random number stream to this variable as a means of 
variance reduction between the ISHM-enabled UAS model and the Non-ISHM UAS 
model. 
IF RandomISHMFAFlag <= ProbISHMFalseAlarm,  
ISHMFalseAlarm (status flag) = 1, ELSE ISHMFalseAlarm (status flag) = 0. 
Logic: Based on probability of ISHM false alarm (representing strength of ISHM diagnostics and prognostics algorithms), assigns a status flag to a sortie.  
Assumption/ 
Additional 
Information: 
Desired performance specification of ISHM system. Has a positive correlation with 
unscheduled ISHM maintenance actions. 
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UAS Recovery States Sub-Models 
Title: UAS Mishap Determination 
Applicable To: Both ISHM-Enabled UAS and Non-ISHM UAS Models 
Type: Sub-Model 
Diagram: 
 
Purpose: Determines if a present failure condition will result in a mishap if undetected. Terminate UAS flight upon detection of first mishap. 
Parameter: 
LatencyThreshold = 5 
UASCrashed (1 or 0, status flag) 
Flight Duration to Mishap = 0.3 * NormalASD – Implemented as a process delay to 
calculate the accumulated flight time of a UAS. 
Logic: 
Given that an existing failure is undetected, an UAS mishap will occur if the failure is 
catastrophic, or if the UAS had 5 previous missed detections of existing failure 
condition. 
Assumption/ 
Additional 
Information: 
Assumed that a maximum of 5 prior missed detections will result in the upgrade in 
severity of a current defect that will result in a mishap if undetected. 
In the event of a mishap, it is assumed that the UAS will fly for only 30% of its normal 
sortie duration. 
 
Title: Code 3 Recoveries 
Applicable To: ISHM-Enabled UAS Model Only 
Type: Sub-Model 
Diagram: 
 
Purpose: Calculates the flight time of a Code 3 mission. Also add an unscheduled component replacement action. 
Parameter: 
Code 3 Flight Duration = 0.5 * NormalASD – Implemented as a process delay to 
calculate the accumulated flight time of a UAS. 
ComponentReplacement – Counter for number of component replacements being 
carried out. 
Logic: Process the flight duration and required maintenance activities for a Code 3 recovery. 
Assumption/ 
Additional 
Information: 
In the event of a Code 3, it is assumed that the UAS will fly for only 50% of its normal 
sortie duration. 
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Title: Code 3 Recoveries 
Applicable To: Non-ISHM UAS Model Only 
Type: Sub-Model 
Diagram: 
 
Purpose: Calculates the flight time of a Code 3 mission. Also adds an unscheduled component replacement action and resets the maintenance interval. 
Parameter: 
Code 3 Flight Duration = 0.5 * NormalASD – Implemented as a process delay to 
calculate the accumulated flight time of a UAS. 
ComponentReplacement – Counter for number of component replacements being 
carried out. 
TimeToScheduledMaintenance = DefinedMaintenanceInterval 
Logic: Process the flight duration and required maintenance activities for a Code 3 recovery. Resets the scheduled maintenance interval upon completion of component replacement. 
Assumption/ 
Additional 
Information: 
In the event of a Code 3, it is assumed that the UAS will fly for only 50% of its normal 
sortie duration. 
 
Title: Code 3 Recoveries (CND) 
Applicable To: Both ISHM-Enabled UAS and Non-ISHM UAS Models 
Type: Sub-Model 
Diagram: 
 
Purpose: 
Calculates the flight time of a Code 3 mission due to ISHM false alarm (for the ISHM-
Enabled UAS model) and due to sensor false alarm (for the Non-ISHM UAS model). 
Also add a Cannot Duplicate (CND) incident. 
Parameter: 
Code 3 Flight Duration = 0.5 * NormalASD – Implemented as a process delay to 
calculate the accumulated flight time of a UAS. 
CND – Counter for number of CND incidents. 
Logic: Process the flight duration and increment the number of CND incidents for a Code 3 CND recovery. 
Assumption/ 
Additional 
Information: 
In the event of a reported Code 3 (although it is a false alarm), it is assumed that the 
UAS will fly for only 50% of its normal sortie duration. 
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Title: Code 2 Recoveries (Sensor False Alarm Only) 
Applicable To: ISHM-Enabled UAS Model Only 
Type: Sub-Model with Single Process Module Only 
Diagram: 
 
Purpose: 
Calculates the flight time of a Code 2 mission. For this case, this sub-model only applies 
to a sortie without a failure condition; correctly diagnosed by ISHM but sensor produces 
a false alarm. 
Parameter: Code 2 Flight Duration = NormalASD – Implemented as a process delay to calculate the accumulated flight time of a UAS. 
Logic: Process the flight duration Code 2 recovery. Requirement for sensor maintenance due to false alarm is being processed by the proceeding sub-model. 
Assumption/ 
Additional 
Information: 
In the event of a Code 2, it is assumed that the UAS will still complete its planned 
mission flying its normal sortie duration. 
 
Title: Code 2 Recoveries (ISHM Missed Detection Only) 
Applicable To: ISHM-Enabled UAS Model Only 
Type: Sub-Model 
Diagram: 
 
Purpose: 
Calculates the flight time of a Code 2 mission. For this case, there is a failure condition 
that is correctly detected by the baseline sensor but ISHM denies the failure condition.  
Hence, also add an unscheduled component replacement action as a failure condition 
exists. 
Parameter: 
Code 2 Flight Duration = NormalASD – Implemented as a process delay to calculate the 
accumulated flight time of a UAS. 
ComponentReplacement – Counter for number of component replacements being 
carried out. 
Logic: 
Process the flight duration and required maintenance activities for a Code 2 recovery. 
Requirement for ISHM maintenance due to missed detection is being processed by the 
proceeding sub-model.  
Assumption/ 
Additional 
Information: 
In the event of a Code 2, it is assumed that the UAS will still complete its planned 
mission flying its normal sortie duration. 
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Title: Code 1 Recoveries 
Applicable To: Both ISHM-Enabled UAS and Non-ISHM UAS Models 
Type: Sub-Model 
Diagram: 
 
Purpose: 
Calculates the flight time of a Code 1 mission. Also assigns failure latency to UAS 
system due to a missed detection (by both ISHM and sensor for an ISHM-Enabled UAS 
model, and by sensor for a Non-ISHM UAS model). 
Parameter: 
Code 1 Flight Duration = NormalASD – Implemented as a process delay to calculate the 
accumulated flight time of a UAS. 
AccumulatedLatencyEffect – system variable of UAS (increase by 1) 
Logic: Process the flight duration and assign failure latency for a Code 1 recovery with missed detections by both ISHM and baseline sensor. 
Assumption/ 
Additional 
Information: 
In the event of a Code 1 recovery with a missed detection of a failure condition, it is 
assumed that the UAS will still complete its planned mission flying its normal sortie 
duration. 
 
Title: Code 1 Recoveries (Good Flight) 
Applicable To: Both ISHM-Enabled UAS and Non-ISHM UAS Models 
Type: Sub-Model with Single Process Module Only 
Diagram: 
 
Purpose: Calculates the flight time of an uneventful Code 1 mission. 
Parameter: Code 1 Flight Duration = NormalASD – Implemented as a process delay to calculate the accumulated flight time of a UAS. 
Logic: Process the flight duration for an uneventful Code 1 recovery. 
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Maintenance Activities Sub-Models 
Title: A14.1 Perform Scheduled Maintenance 
Applicable To: Non-ISHM UAS Model Only 
Type: Sub-Model 
Diagram: 
 
Purpose: Determines if scheduled maintenance is due. 
Parameter: 
TimeToScheduledMaintenance – Time counter that counts down towards due time for 
scheduled maintenance. 
ScheduledMaintenance – Counter for number of scheduled maintenance actions being 
carried out. 
Logic: 
Performs scheduled maintenance action if TimeToScheduledMaintenance is less than or 
equals to 0. Resets the scheduled maintenance interval upon completion of scheduled 
maintenance action. 
Assumption/ 
Additional 
Information: 
Even though scheduled maintenance actions are being carried out, it is assumed that the 
failure rate of the UAS does not change, i.e. system is mature in its operational phase 
with constant failure rate. 
 
Title: A22.1 Perform Unscheduled ISHM Maintenance (ISHM Missed Detection) 
Applicable To: ISHM-Enabled UAS Model Only 
Type: Sub-Model 
Diagram: 
 
Purpose: Determines if unscheduled ISHM maintenance is required. 
Parameter: 
ISHMMissThreshold = 4 
ISHMMaintenance – Counter for number of unscheduled ISHM maintenance actions 
being carried out. 
Logic: Performs unscheduled ISHM maintenance action if ISHM missed detection threshold is exceeded. Resets ISHM missed detection count upon completion of ISHM maintenance. 
Assumption/ 
Additional 
Information: 
Assumed to be an arbitrary target threshold to carry out ISHM maintenance when 
exceeded; should be lower than assumed accumulated latency effect to be meaningful. 
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Title: A22.1 Perform Unscheduled ISHM Maintenance (ISHM False Alarm) 
Applicable To: ISHM-Enabled UAS Model Only 
Type: Sub-Model 
Diagram: 
 
Purpose: Determines if unscheduled ISHM maintenance is required. 
Parameter: 
ISHMFalseAlarmThreshold = 10 
ISHMMaintenance – Counter for number of unscheduled ISHM maintenance actions 
being carried out. 
Logic: Performs unscheduled ISHM maintenance action if ISHM false alarm threshold is exceeded. Resets ISHM false alarm count upon completion of ISHM maintenance. 
Assumption/ 
Additional 
Information: 
Assumed to be an arbitrary target threshold to carry out ISHM maintenance when 
exceeded; should be higher that missed detection threshold due to no safety of flight 
concern. 
 
Title: A14.3 Perform Unscheduled Sensor Maintenance (Sensor Missed Detection) 
Applicable To: ISHM-Enabled UAS Model Only 
Type: Sub-Model 
Diagram: 
 
Purpose: Determines if unscheduled sensor maintenance is required. 
Parameter: 
SensorMissThreshold = 4 
SensorMaintenance – Counter for number of unscheduled sensor maintenance actions 
being carried out. 
Logic: Performs unscheduled sensor maintenance action if sensor missed detection threshold is exceeded. Resets sensor missed detection count upon completion of sensor maintenance. 
Assumption/ 
Additional 
Information: 
Assumed to be an arbitrary target threshold to carry out sensor maintenance when 
exceeded; should be lower than assumed accumulated latency effect to be meaningful. 
Only applicable for an ISHM-Enabled UAS model since for the isolated baseline sensor 
of a non-ISHM UAS, the latter would not know that it has missed a detection without 
secondary detection mechanisms (such as onboard ISHM). 
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Title: A14.3 Perform Unscheduled Sensor Maintenance (Sensor False Alarm) 
Applicable To: Both ISHM-Enabled UAS and Non-ISHM UAS Models 
Type: Sub-Model 
Diagram: 
 
Purpose: Determines if unscheduled sensor maintenance is required. 
Parameter: 
SensorFalseAlarmThreshold = 10 
SensorMaintenance – Counter for number of unscheduled sensor maintenance actions 
being carried out. 
Logic: Performs unscheduled sensor maintenance action if sensor false alarm threshold is exceeded. Resets sensor false alarm count upon completion of sensor maintenance. 
Assumption/ 
Additional 
Information: 
Assumed to be an arbitrary target threshold to carry out sensor maintenance when 
exceeded; should be higher that missed detection threshold due to no safety of flight 
concern. 
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Statistics Record Modules 
Title: Statistics Collection 
Type: Record Modules 
Purpose: Records parameters of interest for verification and analysis. 
Module Names: 
 
For Both Simulation Models 
UAS Expected Lifetime 
Total Unscheduled Component Replacements 
Total Sensor Maintenance 
Number of Sorties With Failures 
Number of Sorties Without Failures 
 
For ISHM-Enabled UAS Model Only 
Code 2 With ISHM Miss 
Code 1 With Both ISHM and Sensor Misses 
Code 3 With Sensor Miss 
Code 3 With Both ISHM and Sensor Confirmation 
Code 3 With Both ISHM and Sensor False Alarms 
Code 3 With ISHM False Alarm Only 
Code 2 With Sensor False Alarm 
Code 1 Good Flight Without False Alarm 
Total ISHM Maintenance 
 
For Non-ISHM UAS Only 
Code 3 Sensor Detected 
Code 1 Sensor Miss 
Code 3 CND With Sensor False Alarm 
Code 1 Good Flight Without False Alarm 
Total Scheduled Maintenance 
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Appendix B: Analysis Results – Experimental Objectives and Ranking Results 
Objective 1: Investigate Dependence of UAS Expected Lifetime on Failure Rate, λ 
Table B-1 – Dependence of UAS Expected Lifetime on Failure Rate, λ 
 
 
 
Ra
nk
in
g Failure Occurrence 
Rate
[Per Flying Hour]
Probability of 
Detection 
(Baseline Sensor)
Probability of ISHM 
Confidence
UAS Lifetime
(ISHM-Enabled UAS)
[Hours]
UAS Lifetime
(Non-ISHM UAS)
[Hours]
1 0.00001 0.6 0.9 3,662,213.50 1,025,301.50
2 0.00001 0.7 0.9 3,662,213.50 1,490,861.00
3 0.00001 0.8 0.9 3,662,213.50 2,423,547.00
4 0.00001 0.9 0.9 3,662,213.50 7,199,106.50
5 0.00001 0.6 0.8 2,029,693.00 1,025,301.50
6 0.00001 0.7 0.8 2,029,693.00 1,490,861.00
7 0.00001 0.8 0.8 2,029,693.00 2,423,547.00
8 0.00001 0.9 0.8 2,029,693.00 7,199,106.50
9 0.00001 0.6 0.7 1,722,959.50 1,025,301.50
10 0.00001 0.7 0.7 1,722,959.50 1,490,861.00
11 0.00001 0.8 0.7 1,722,959.50 2,423,547.00
12 0.00001 0.9 0.7 1,722,959.50 7,199,106.50
13 0.00001 0.6 0.6 1,541,751.50 1,025,301.50
14 0.00001 0.7 0.6 1,541,751.50 1,490,861.00
15 0.00001 0.8 0.6 1,541,751.50 2,423,547.00
16 0.00001 0.9 0.6 1,541,751.50 7,199,106.50
17 0.0001 0.6 0.9 354,312.50 103,479.50
18 0.0001 0.7 0.9 354,312.50 154,323.50
19 0.0001 0.8 0.9 354,312.50 253,859.00
20 0.0001 0.9 0.9 354,312.50 731,245.50
21 0.0001 0.6 0.8 191,844.50 103,479.50
22 0.0001 0.7 0.8 191,844.50 154,323.50
23 0.0001 0.8 0.8 191,844.50 253,859.00
24 0.0001 0.9 0.8 191,844.50 731,245.50
25 0.0001 0.6 0.7 158,851.50 103,479.50
26 0.0001 0.7 0.7 158,851.50 154,323.50
27 0.0001 0.8 0.7 158,851.50 253,859.00
28 0.0001 0.9 0.7 158,851.50 731,245.50
29 0.0001 0.6 0.6 139,169.00 103,479.50
30 0.0001 0.7 0.6 139,169.00 154,323.50
31 0.0001 0.8 0.6 139,169.00 253,859.00
32 0.0001 0.9 0.6 139,169.00 731,245.50
33 0.001 0.6 0.9 38,676.00 10,755.50
34 0.001 0.7 0.9 38,676.00 15,623.00
35 0.001 0.8 0.9 38,676.00 24,979.50
36 0.001 0.9 0.9 38,676.00 74,975.50
37 0.001 0.6 0.8 22,096.50 10,755.50
38 0.001 0.7 0.8 22,096.50 15,623.00
39 0.001 0.8 0.8 22,096.50 24,979.50
40 0.001 0.9 0.8 22,096.50 74,975.50
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Ra
nk
in
g Failure Occurrence 
Rate
[Per Flying Hour]
Probability of 
Detection 
(Baseline Sensor)
Probability of ISHM 
Confidence
UAS Lifetime
(ISHM-Enabled UAS)
[Hours]
UAS Lifetime
(Non-ISHM UAS)
[Hours]
41 0.001 0.6 0.7 18,828.00 10,755.50
42 0.001 0.7 0.7 18,828.00 15,623.00
43 0.001 0.8 0.7 18,828.00 24,979.50
44 0.001 0.9 0.7 18,828.00 74,975.50
45 0.001 0.6 0.6 16,477.50 10,755.50
46 0.001 0.7 0.6 16,477.50 15,623.00
47 0.001 0.8 0.6 16,477.50 24,979.50
48 0.001 0.9 0.6 16,477.50 74,975.50
49 0.01 0.6 0.9 3,878.50 1,105.00
50 0.01 0.7 0.9 3,878.50 1,687.50
51 0.01 0.8 0.9 3,878.50 2,634.50
52 0.01 0.9 0.9 3,878.50 7,679.50
53 0.01 0.6 0.8 2,266.00 1,105.00
54 0.01 0.7 0.8 2,266.00 1,687.50
55 0.01 0.8 0.8 2,266.00 2,634.50
56 0.01 0.9 0.8 2,266.00 7,679.50
57 0.01 0.6 0.7 1,914.50 1,105.00
58 0.01 0.7 0.7 1,914.50 1,687.50
59 0.01 0.8 0.7 1,914.50 2,634.50
60 0.01 0.9 0.7 1,914.50 7,679.50
61 0.01 0.6 0.6 1,689.00 1,105.00
62 0.01 0.7 0.6 1,689.00 1,687.50
63 0.01 0.8 0.6 1,689.00 2,634.50
64 0.01 0.9 0.6 1,689.00 7,679.50
65 0.1 0.6 0.9 432.50 121.00
66 0.1 0.7 0.9 432.50 189.00
67 0.1 0.8 0.9 432.50 307.50
68 0.1 0.9 0.9 432.50 865.50
69 0.1 0.6 0.8 246.50 121.00
70 0.1 0.7 0.8 246.50 189.00
71 0.1 0.8 0.8 246.50 307.50
72 0.1 0.9 0.8 246.50 865.50
73 0.1 0.6 0.7 208.00 121.00
74 0.1 0.7 0.7 208.00 189.00
75 0.1 0.8 0.7 208.00 307.50
76 0.1 0.9 0.7 208.00 865.50
77 0.1 0.6 0.6 185.00 121.00
78 0.1 0.7 0.6 185.00 189.00
79 0.1 0.8 0.6 185.00 307.50
80 0.1 0.9 0.6 185.00 865.50
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Objective 2: Maximize Percentage of Lifetime Extension through ISHM 
Implementation 
 
Table B-2 – Maximize Percentage of Lifetime Extension through ISHM Implementation 
 
 
Ra
nk
in
g Failure Occurrence 
Rate
[Per Flying Hour]
Probability of 
Detection 
(Baseline Sensor)
Probability of ISHM 
Confidence
UAS Lifetime
(ISHM-Enabled UAS)
[Hours]
(a)
UAS Lifetime
(Non-ISHM UAS)
[Hours]
(b)
Increase in UAS 
Lifetime
(c) = (a)-(b)
% Lifetime Gain
(d) = (c)/(b)
1 0.001 0.6 0.9 38676 10755.5 27920.5 259.59%
2 0.01 0.6 0.9 3878.5 1105 2773.5 251.00%
3 0.0001 0.6 0.9 354312.5 103479.5 250833 242.40%
4 0.001 0.7 0.9 38676 15623 23053 147.56%
5 0.01 0.7 0.9 3878.5 1687.5 2191 129.84%
6 0.0001 0.7 0.9 354312.5 154323.5 199989 129.59%
7 0.001 0.6 0.8 22096.5 10755.5 11341 105.44%
8 0.01 0.6 0.8 2266 1105 1161 105.07%
9 0.0001 0.6 0.8 191844.5 103479.5 88365 85.39%
10 0.001 0.6 0.7 18828 10755.5 8072.5 75.05%
11 0.01 0.6 0.7 1914.5 1105 809.5 73.26%
12 0.001 0.8 0.9 38676 24979.5 13696.5 54.83%
13 0.0001 0.6 0.7 158851.5 103479.5 55372 53.51%
14 0.001 0.6 0.6 16477.5 10755.5 5722 53.20%
15 0.01 0.6 0.6 1689 1105 584 52.85%
16 0.01 0.8 0.9 3878.5 2634.5 1244 47.22%
17 0.001 0.7 0.8 22096.5 15623 6473.5 41.44%
18 0.0001 0.8 0.9 354312.5 253859 100453.5 39.57%
19 0.0001 0.6 0.6 139169 103479.5 35689.5 34.49%
20 0.01 0.7 0.8 2266 1687.5 578.5 34.28%
21 0.0001 0.7 0.8 191844.5 154323.5 37521 24.31%
22 0.001 0.7 0.7 18828 15623 3205 20.51%
23 0.01 0.7 0.7 1914.5 1687.5 227 13.45%
24 0.001 0.7 0.6 16477.5 15623 854.5 5.47%
25 0.0001 0.7 0.7 158851.5 154323.5 4528 2.93%
26 0.01 0.7 0.6 1689 1687.5 1.5 0.09%
27 0.0001 0.7 0.6 139169 154323.5 -15154.5 -9.82%
28 0.001 0.8 0.8 22096.5 24979.5 -2883 -11.54%
29 0.01 0.8 0.8 2266 2634.5 -368.5 -13.99%
30 0.0001 0.8 0.8 191844.5 253859 -62014.5 -24.43%
31 0.001 0.8 0.7 18828 24979.5 -6151.5 -24.63%
32 0.01 0.8 0.7 1914.5 2634.5 -720 -27.33%
33 0.001 0.8 0.6 16477.5 24979.5 -8502 -34.04%
34 0.01 0.8 0.6 1689 2634.5 -945.5 -35.89%
35 0.0001 0.8 0.7 158851.5 253859 -95007.5 -37.43%
36 0.0001 0.8 0.6 139169 253859 -114690 -45.18%
37 0.001 0.9 0.9 38676 74975.5 -36299.5 -48.42%
38 0.01 0.9 0.9 3878.5 7679.5 -3801 -49.50%
39 0.0001 0.9 0.9 354312.5 731245.5 -376933 -51.55%
40 0.01 0.9 0.8 2266 7679.5 -5413.5 -70.49%
41 0.001 0.9 0.8 22096.5 74975.5 -52879 -70.53%
42 0.0001 0.9 0.8 191844.5 731245.5 -539401 -73.76%
43 0.001 0.9 0.7 18828 74975.5 -56147.5 -74.89%
44 0.01 0.9 0.7 1914.5 7679.5 -5765 -75.07%
45 0.01 0.9 0.6 1689 7679.5 -5990.5 -78.01%
46 0.001 0.9 0.6 16477.5 74975.5 -58498 -78.02%
47 0.0001 0.9 0.7 158851.5 731245.5 -572394 -78.28%
48 0.0001 0.9 0.6 139169 731245.5 -592076.5 -80.97%
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Objective 3: Minimize Number of Cannot Duplicate (CND) Cases through ISHM 
Implementation 
 
Table B-3 – Minimize Number of Cannot Duplicate (CND) Cases through ISHM Implementation 
 
 
 
Ra
nk
in
g Failure Occurrence 
Rate
[Per Flying Hour]
Probability of False 
Alarm
(Baseline Sensor)
Probability of
ISHM False Alarm
Total Cases of CND
(ISHM-Enabled UAS)
[a]
Total Cases of CND
(Non-ISHM UAS)
[b]
Reduction in CND
[c]=[b]-[a]
% Reduction in 
CND
[d]=[c]/[b]
1 0.0001 0.05 0.01 193 1286 1093 84.99%
2 0.0001 0.05 0.02 390 1286 896 69.67%
3 0.0001 0.04 0.01 193 1023 830 81.13%
4 0.0001 0.05 0.03 584 1286 702 54.59%
5 0.0001 0.04 0.02 390 1023 633 61.88%
6 0.0001 0.03 0.01 193 768 575 74.87%
7 0.0001 0.05 0.04 778 1286 508 39.50%
8 0.0001 0.04 0.03 584 1023 439 42.91%
9 0.0001 0.03 0.02 390 768 378 49.22%
10 0.0001 0.02 0.01 193 515 322 62.52%
11 0.0001 0.05 0.05 977 1286 309 24.03%
12 0.0001 0.04 0.04 778 1023 245 23.95%
13 0.0001 0.03 0.03 584 768 184 23.96%
14 0.0001 0.02 0.02 390 515 125 24.27%
15 0.001 0.05 0.01 22 128 106 82.81%
16 0.001 0.05 0.02 45 128 83 64.84%
17 0.001 0.04 0.01 22 103 81 78.64%
18 0.001 0.05 0.03 66 128 62 48.44%
19 0.0001 0.01 0.01 193 252 59 23.41%
20 0.001 0.04 0.02 45 103 58 56.31%
21 0.001 0.03 0.01 22 76 54 71.05%
22 0.0001 0.04 0.05 977 1023 46 4.50%
23 0.001 0.05 0.04 89 128 39 30.47%
24 0.001 0.04 0.03 66 103 37 35.92%
25 0.001 0.03 0.02 45 76 31 40.79%
26 0.001 0.02 0.01 22 51 29 56.86%
27 0.001 0.05 0.05 111 128 17 13.28%
28 0.001 0.04 0.04 89 103 14 13.59%
29 0.01 0.05 0.01 2 13 11 84.62%
30 0.001 0.03 0.03 66 76 10 13.16%
31 0.01 0.04 0.01 2 10 8 80.00%
32 0.01 0.05 0.02 5 13 8 61.54%
33 0.01 0.03 0.01 2 8 6 75.00%
34 0.01 0.05 0.03 7 13 6 46.15%
35 0.001 0.02 0.02 45 51 6 11.76%
36 0.01 0.04 0.02 5 10 5 50.00%
37 0.01 0.05 0.04 9 13 4 30.77%
38 0.01 0.02 0.01 2 5 3 60.00%
39 0.01 0.03 0.02 5 8 3 37.50%
40 0.01 0.04 0.03 7 10 3 30.00%
41 0.001 0.01 0.01 22 25 3 12.00%
42 0.01 0.05 0.05 11 13 2 15.38%
43 0.01 0.03 0.03 7 8 1 12.50%
44 0.01 0.04 0.04 9 10 1 10.00%
45 0.01 0.01 0.01 2 2 0 0.00%
46 0.01 0.02 0.02 5 5 0 0.00%
47 0.01 0.04 0.05 11 10 -1 -10.00%
48 0.01 0.03 0.04 9 8 -1 -12.50%
49 0.01 0.02 0.03 7 5 -2 -40.00%
50 0.01 0.03 0.05 11 8 -3 -37.50%
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Ra
nk
in
g Failure Occurrence 
Rate
[Per Flying Hour]
Probability of False 
Alarm
(Baseline Sensor)
Probability of
ISHM False Alarm
Total Cases of CND
(ISHM-Enabled UAS)
[a]
Total Cases of CND
(Non-ISHM UAS)
[b]
Reduction in CND
[c]=[b]-[a]
% Reduction in 
CND
[d]=[c]/[b]
51 0.01 0.01 0.02 5 2 -3 -150.00%
52 0.01 0.02 0.04 9 5 -4 -80.00%
53 0.01 0.01 0.03 7 2 -5 -250.00%
54 0.01 0.02 0.05 11 5 -6 -120.00%
55 0.01 0.01 0.04 9 2 -7 -350.00%
56 0.001 0.04 0.05 111 103 -8 -7.77%
57 0.01 0.01 0.05 11 2 -9 -450.00%
58 0.0001 0.03 0.04 778 768 -10 -1.30%
59 0.001 0.03 0.04 89 76 -13 -17.11%
60 0.001 0.02 0.03 66 51 -15 -29.41%
61 0.001 0.01 0.02 45 25 -20 -80.00%
62 0.001 0.03 0.05 111 76 -35 -46.05%
63 0.001 0.02 0.04 89 51 -38 -74.51%
64 0.001 0.01 0.03 66 25 -41 -164.00%
65 0.001 0.02 0.05 111 51 -60 -117.65%
66 0.001 0.01 0.04 89 25 -64 -256.00%
67 0.0001 0.02 0.03 584 515 -69 -13.40%
68 0.001 0.01 0.05 111 25 -86 -344.00%
69 0.0001 0.01 0.02 390 252 -138 -54.76%
70 0.0001 0.03 0.05 977 768 -209 -27.21%
71 0.0001 0.02 0.04 778 515 -263 -51.07%
72 0.0001 0.01 0.03 584 252 -332 -131.75%
73 0.0001 0.02 0.05 977 515 -462 -89.71%
74 0.0001 0.01 0.04 778 252 -526 -208.73%
75 0.0001 0.01 0.05 977 252 -725 -287.70%
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Objective 4: Minimize Number of Maintenance Actions through ISHM 
Implementation 
 
Table B-4 – Minimize Number of Maintenance Actions through ISHM Implementation 
 
 
Ra
nk
in
g Failure Occurrence 
Rate
[Per Flying Hour]
Probability of False 
Alarm
(Baseline Sensor)
Probability of
ISHM False Alarm
Total Maintenance 
Actions
(ISHM-Enabled UAS)
[a]
Total Maintenance 
Actions
(Non-ISHM UAS)
[b]
Reduction of 
Maintenance 
Actions
[c]=[b]-[a]
% Reduction in 
Maintenance 
Actions
[d]=[c]/[b]
1 0.0001 0.05 0.01 309 1655 1346 81.33%
2 0.0001 0.05 0.02 526 1655 1129 68.22%
3 0.0001 0.04 0.01 289 1367 1078 78.86%
4 0.0001 0.05 0.03 739 1655 916 55.35%
5 0.0001 0.04 0.02 506 1367 861 62.98%
6 0.0001 0.03 0.01 270 1088 818 75.18%
7 0.0001 0.05 0.04 952 1655 703 42.48%
8 0.0001 0.04 0.03 719 1367 648 47.40%
9 0.0001 0.03 0.02 487 1088 601 55.24%
10 0.0001 0.02 0.01 252 811 559 68.93%
11 0.0001 0.05 0.05 1171 1655 484 29.24%
12 0.0001 0.04 0.04 932 1367 435 31.82%
13 0.0001 0.03 0.03 700 1088 388 35.66%
14 0.0001 0.02 0.02 469 811 342 42.17%
15 0.0001 0.01 0.01 232 523 291 55.64%
16 0.0001 0.04 0.05 1151 1367 216 15.80%
17 0.0001 0.03 0.04 913 1088 175 16.08%
18 0.0001 0.02 0.03 682 811 129 15.91%
19 0.001 0.05 0.01 36 157 121 77.13%
20 0.001 0.05 0.02 61 157 96 61.25%
21 0.001 0.04 0.01 34 130 96 73.85%
22 0.0001 0.01 0.02 449 523 74 14.15%
23 0.001 0.05 0.03 84 157 73 46.63%
24 0.001 0.04 0.02 59 130 71 54.62%
25 0.001 0.03 0.01 32 100 68 68.00%
26 0.001 0.05 0.04 109 157 48 30.75%
27 0.001 0.04 0.03 82 130 48 36.92%
28 0.001 0.02 0.01 29 73 44 60.27%
29 0.001 0.03 0.02 57 100 43 43.00%
30 0.001 0.05 0.05 134 157 23 14.87%
31 0.001 0.04 0.04 107 130 23 17.69%
32 0.001 0.03 0.03 80 100 20 20.00%
33 0.001 0.02 0.02 54 73 19 26.03%
34 0.001 0.01 0.01 27 44 17 38.64%
35 0.01 0.05 0.01 4 15 11 73.15%
36 0.01 0.04 0.01 4 12 8 66.67%
37 0.01 0.05 0.02 7 15 8 53.02%
38 0.01 0.03 0.01 3 10 7 70.00%
39 0.01 0.05 0.03 9 15 6 39.60%
40 0.01 0.04 0.02 7 12 5 41.67%
41 0.01 0.03 0.02 6 10 4 40.00%
42 0.01 0.02 0.01 3 6 3 50.00%
43 0.01 0.04 0.03 9 12 3 25.00%
44 0.01 0.05 0.04 12 15 3 19.46%
45 0.01 0.03 0.03 8 10 2 20.00%
46 0.01 0.05 0.05 14 15 1 6.04%
47 0.01 0.01 0.01 3 3 0 0.00%
48 0.01 0.02 0.02 6 6 0 0.00%
49 0.01 0.04 0.04 12 12 0 0.00%
50 0.01 0.03 0.04 11 10 -1 -10.00%
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Ra
nk
in
g Failure Occurrence 
Rate
[Per Flying Hour]
Probability of False 
Alarm
(Baseline Sensor)
Probability of
ISHM False Alarm
Total Maintenance 
Actions
(ISHM-Enabled UAS)
[a]
Total Maintenance 
Actions
(Non-ISHM UAS)
[b]
Reduction of 
Maintenance 
Actions
[c]=[b]-[a]
% Reduction in 
Maintenance 
Actions
[d]=[c]/[b]
51 0.001 0.04 0.05 132 130 -2 -1.54%
52 0.01 0.04 0.05 14 12 -2 -16.67%
53 0.01 0.02 0.03 8 6 -2 -33.33%
54 0.01 0.03 0.05 13 10 -3 -30.00%
55 0.01 0.01 0.02 6 3 -3 -100.00%
56 0.001 0.02 0.03 77 73 -4 -5.48%
57 0.001 0.03 0.04 105 100 -5 -5.00%
58 0.01 0.02 0.04 11 6 -5 -83.33%
59 0.01 0.01 0.03 8 3 -5 -166.67%
60 0.01 0.02 0.05 13 6 -7 -116.67%
61 0.001 0.01 0.02 52 44 -8 -18.18%
62 0.01 0.01 0.04 11 3 -8 -266.67%
63 0.01 0.01 0.05 13 3 -10 -333.33%
64 0.001 0.02 0.04 102 73 -29 -39.73%
65 0.001 0.03 0.05 130 100 -30 -30.00%
66 0.001 0.01 0.03 75 44 -31 -70.45%
67 0.0001 0.03 0.05 1132 1088 -44 -4.04%
68 0.001 0.02 0.05 127 73 -54 -73.97%
69 0.001 0.01 0.04 100 44 -56 -127.27%
70 0.001 0.01 0.05 125 44 -81 -184.09%
71 0.0001 0.02 0.04 895 811 -84 -10.36%
72 0.0001 0.01 0.03 662 523 -139 -26.58%
73 0.0001 0.02 0.05 1114 811 -303 -37.36%
74 0.0001 0.01 0.04 875 523 -352 -67.30%
75 0.0001 0.01 0.05 1094 523 -571 -109.18%
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